(1.) This revision petition is directed against the order of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Nellore in A.C. No. 667/76. The excess land liable to be surrendered by the petitioner's family unit was determined at 1.0353 standard holdings.
(2.) In this revision petition, Sri P.Sreerama Murthy, learned counse. for the petitioner contends (1) that an extent of Ac. 7-00 in S. No. 551 sold to one Ravuri Ramayya under angagreement for sale, Ex. A3 dated 4-5-1962 and held by him ought to have been excluded in computing the petitioner's holding; and (2) that both the Tribunals erred in rejecting the plea of adoption of Ramakrishnaiah by Seshamma, the widow of petioner's uncle and in not allowing the area to which he is entitled from out of the said property now computed in the petitioner's holding. Point No. 1 : The contention of the petitioner is that an extent of Ac. 7-00 in S.No. 551 was sold under an agreement for sale dt. 4-5-1962 to Ravuri Ramayya and that he is in possession thereof in part performance of an agreement for sale and that the same should be excluded in computing his holding. The said Ravuri Ramayya has filed a declaration C.C. 873/75 before the same Tribunal. The Tribunal has after enquiry accepted his declaration and determined the surplus liable to be surrendered by him at 0-1667 standard holdings. That order has become final. This unequivocally establishes that Ravuri Ramayya is holding the land on the relevant date. The petitioner has filed C.M.P. 9142/78 to receive certain documents including the above referred order of the Land Reforms Tribunal by way of additional evidence. This petition is allowed. In view of the order in C.C. 873/75 dated 17-5-1976, the extent of Ac. 7-00 sold to Ravuri Ramayya and included in his holding cannot be included in the holding of the petitioner as laid down in Authorised Officer v. K.C.V. Nara- sayya (1) 1978(1) APLJ. 98. The said extent shall therefore be excluded from the petitioner's holding. Point No. 1 is answered accordingly. Point No. 2: It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner's father and his two uncles constituted a joint family and the property now computed in the petitioner's holding was their ancestral and joint family property. The petitioner had pleaded that both his uncles died after the commencement of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act came into force. That plea, was, however, rejected by both the Tribunals and the learned counsel for the petitioner also does not press that question now. He, however, contends that Seshamma, the widow of one of his uncles adopted Ramakrishnaiah on 16-5-1970 and executed an adoption deed, Ex. A1 and the said Ramakrishnaiah became a co-parcener with the petitioner's father and himself and consequently, he is also entitled to a 1/3rd share. Therefore, the said share should be excluded in computing the petitioner's holding. Both the Tribunals have held that the adoption is not true mainly on the ground that the adoption deed is not registered. For the validity of an adoption by a Hindu.it is not necessary that an adoption deed should at all be executed, much less Is it required to be registered. Ex.A1 was, therefore, admissiblejn evidence. Ex. A2 is.the Lagna Patrika fixing the Muhurtham for adoption. P.W.1. is the petitioner who has spoken to the factum of adoption. P.W.2 is the Purohit who fixed the Muhurtham for the adoption and he is also the scribe of Lagna Patrika as well as the adoption deed. He also presided over the adoption ceremony of Datta Homam. The evidence of these witnesses has remained unchallenged by way of cross-examination. The only question put in cross-examination is as to why the adoption deed is not registered. That does not rebut the evidence as regards the adoption. No evidence whatsoever is let in to disprove the factum of adoption. There are also no circumstances to hold that the adoption is not true. The evidence is entirely one aided pointing to the truth of the adoption pleaded by the petitioner. The finding of both the Tribunals is reversed and accordingly I hold Ramakrishnaiah to be the adopted son of Seshamma. In Sita Bai V. Ramachandra (1) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 343 the Supreme Court held :- The scheme of Sections 11 and 12, therefore, is that in the case of adoption by a widow the adopted child becomes absorbed in adoptive family to which the widow belonged. In other words the child adopted is tied with the relationship of sonship with the deceased husband of the widow. The other collateral relations of the husband would be connected with the child through that deceased husband of the widow. For instance, the husband's brother would necessarily be the uncle of the adopted child. The daughter of the adoptive mother (and father) would necessarily be the sister of the adopted son, and in this way, the adopted son would become a member of the widow's family, with the ties of relationship with the deceased husband of the widow as his adoptive father. It is true that Section 14 of the Act does not expressly state that the child adopted by the widow, becomes the adopted son of the husband of the widow. But it Is a necessary implication of Sections 12 and 14 of the Act that a son adopted by the widow becomes a son not only of the widow but also of the deceased husband. It is for this reason that we find in sub-section (4) of Section 14 a provision that where a widow adopts a child and subsequently marries a husband, the husband becomes the "step-father" of the adopted child. The true effect and interpretation of Sees. 11 and 12 of Act No. 78 of 1956 therefore is that when either of the spouses adopts a child, all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth become completely severed and these are all replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family. In other words the result of adoption by either spouse is that the adoptive child becomes the child of both the spouses." 11 was further held :-
(3.) Mr. Seetharam Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner how ever, placed reliance on earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Sawan Ram vs. Kalwanti (3)AIR. 1967 SC. 1761 that in a case where one of the coparceners died in the year 1936 by which time the Women's Right to Property Act had not been enacted and the sole surviving coparcener became the full owner of the property, and one of the widows of a member of the coparcener adopted a boy, the Court held :-