(1.) This appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Vinukonda in Crl.M.P.No. 86 of 77 in C.C.No.62 of 77 on the file of his court. The appellant filed a complaint under Sections 343 and 347 I.P.C. against the respondents who are police officers. At the commencement of the trlai, the respondents Filed the Crl.M.P. 86 of 77 objecting to the trial of the caee on the ground that the court should not have taken cognigance of the offences except with the previous sanction of the concerned authority as required under Section 6(1) (c) of the PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1947. After due consideration of the objection raised by the respondents, the Magistrate allowed the petition and declined to proceed with the case any further.
(2.) In allowing the petition, the learned Magistrate observed as follows: "The facts of the complaint petition as a whole, as well as the concluding allegation against the accused will certainly reveal the fact that the accused allegedly confirmed two persons in police lockup and demanded illegal gratification of about five sovereigns of gold for their release when the complainant and his list witnesses approached the police. Therefore, ends will justify the means. In such circumstances, it is evident that the accused made a demand of illegal gratification as revealed from the facts of the complaint petition. It is also not the case of the complainant that the accused detained the said two persons wrongfully to recover the stolen property but only to extent some illegal gratification. So much so, the main offence, according to the facts of the complaint petition, will only attract Section 5 of the PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1947 as urged by the learned defence counsel and therefore Section 6(c) of the said Act is attracted." Sri. E.V. Bhagiratharao, the learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the allegations in the complaint petition disclose not only an offence punishable under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act but also offences punishable under Sections 343 and 347 of the Indian Penal Code and that it is perfectly open to the complainnant to prosecute the respondents for the offences punishable under Sections 342 and 347 I.P.C, without any previous sanction. It is argued that the question of previous sanction arises only if the complainant seeks to prosecute the accused for the offence under Section 5 of the PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1947. In support of his submission he relies on Baijnath vs. State of M.P. (1), A.I.R. 1966, S.C 220. Durgacharan vs. State of Orissa(2) AIR. 1966, SC. 1775. and Govinda Merita vs. State of Bihar (3). A.I.R. 1971, S.C. 1708.
(3.) The law is well-settled that when the facts alleged in a complaint petition disclose primarily an offence to prosecute which a sanction is necessary, it would not be open to the prosecutor to evade the requirement of sanction by any camouflage or device so as to prosecute the offender under some other Section of law not requiring a sanction, It is also well-settled that when a person commits several offences in the course of the same transaction and if the more serious offence requires a previous sanction or a special complaint, it would not be open to the prosecution to ignore the serious charge arid prosecute the offender for the less serious charges which do not require a special complaint or previous sanction.