R LILAVATHI Vs. DANDU BALA NARASAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondents filed a petition for eviction against one R. Nagaiah on the ground of wilful default in paying the rents. The eviction petition was instituted sometime in 1976. R. Nagaiah, against whom the petition was filed, was dead long prior to the institution of the said petition. In fact, the finding now is that he died on 11th February, 1974. Having obtained an order of eviction, the respondents took out execution and. on 13th July, 1977, the revision-petitioners herein who are the wife and children of the said Nagaiah, were forcibly evicted. In fact, the petitioner's case is that the eviction was effected in their absence. Soon thereafter the petitioners applied to the Court below for restoration of possession on the ground that the crder of eviction passed against a dead person was a nullity and that, the respondents obtained the said order of eviction by practising fraud upon the Court. The Court below found as a fact that the eviction order was passed against a dead person, but dismissed the petition on the ground that it has no power to restore possession to the petitioners and observing that, the only course for the petitioners is to institute a civil suit for appropriate relief. This civil revision petition is filed against the said order.

(2.) The finding of the Court below that R. Nagaiah died even on 11th February, 1974 is not disputed, nor can it be disputed in this Court. The only argument put forward by the Counsel for the respondents is that section 144, Civil Procedure Code, does not apply to the Rent Controller's Court and that, the Rent Controller does not also possess inherent powers like that of a Civil Court. It is not necessary for me to deal with the said question, inasmuch as I am of the firm opinion that an act of a Court should not prejudice a party and that, whenever it is brought to the notice of the Court that it has been made a party to a thoroughly illegal and void order, either by misrepresentation of facts or by playing fraud upon it, it should have the power to rectify the wrong. The Court cannot say that while it can be party to a wrong order, It has no power to remedy the same. A Court or a Tribunal (it is unnecessary for me to consider in this case whether the Rent Controller is a "Court") has always the power -call it incidental power or inherent power, or by any other name -to rectify the injustice brought about by its orders. To the same effect is the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court in Busching Schmitz v. Menghani. In the circumstances, therefore, the Rent Controller was in error in holding that he has no power to set aside the order of eviction or to order restoration. The civil revision petition is, accordingly, allowed and it is directed that the revision-petitioners be put in possession of the premises from which they were evicted in pursuance to the orders of eviction passed in R. C. No. 477 of 1976.

(3.) Mr. Chella Sitaramayya, the learned Counsel for the respondents, however, brought to my notice that after evicting the revision-petitioners the respondents have leased out the said premises to a third-party and that such third-party is now in possession as a tenant. He says that the impugned order of the Rent Controller was passed on 29th September 1977 all though the certified copy was made available to the petitioners on 5th October, 1977, itself, the petitioners filed this civil revision petition only in November, 1977 and obtained interim orders only in November. But, I find that the civil revision petition was presented on 14th October, 1977 itself and admitted on llth November, 1977. On llth November, 1977 itself this Court granted an interim direction against the respondents not to sell or induct tenants in the said premises pending the civil revision petition. The said interim direction was however, vacated on 13th Feburary, 1978 on the ground that the premises was leased out to another tenant even on 3rd October, 1977. It is obvious that the respondents acted with undue haste in leasing out the premises to a third-party and it is clear that they wanted to face the Court with a fait accompli. The order of the Rent Controller was passed on 29th September, 1977, and they say that they have leased out the premises to a third party on 3rd October, 1977, i.e., within four days. The tenant so inducted cannot claim any independent rights, nor can he claim any immunity from eviction. He can claim only through the respondents who have inducted him into possession. However in the circumstances of the case, one month's time is granted from today for the respondents to evict the said tenant and deliver the vacant possession of the said premises to the revision-petitioners. In default, thereof, the petitioners will be entitled to be put in possession of the said premises by evicting the respondents and/or their tenants in occupation of the said premises.