G ESWARAREDDY Vs. P RAMAKRISHNAREDDY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner and the 1st respondent were contenders for the post of Village Munsif of Pandipad Village, in Kurnool District. The Revenue Divisional Officer appointed the petitioner in preference to the 1st respondent, but, in appeal, the District Revenue Officer held that the 1st respondent is a more suitable person for the post. The petitioner's appeal to the Board of Revenue, and revision to the Government proved unsuccessful and, therefore, he has approached this court by way of this writ petition.

(2.) The only contention raised by Mr.P.A. Chowdary, in this writ petition is that the 1st respondent is disqualified from holding the said post under rule 10(2} (ii) (c) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Village Offices Service Rules, 1969. According to rule 10 (2) (ii) (c) "No person shall be eligible for appointment to any Village Office if he:- "(c) has been convicted by a Criminal Court for any offence involving moral turpitude". Now, it is not in dispute that the 1st respondent was convicted by a Criminal Court, in S.T.C.No. 274/1975, under Sec. 33 of the Andhra Pradesh Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act 1958. The order of the Criminal Court dated 14-2-1975, reads as follows:- 'Accused present. Copy of charge-sheet furnished, Examined under Section 251 Cr.P.C. Pleads guilty. Convicted under section 252, Cr.P.C. and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 40/-; in default one month S.l." The Andhra Pradesh Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1958 Is intended to provide for enforcement of the standard weights and measures, and for matters connected therewith. Section 7 of the Act prohibits the use of any weight or measure other than the standard weights and measures prepared under Section 6 of the Act. Chapter IV of the Act provides for penalties for various violations of the Act, Sec. 33 reads as follows:-

(3.) The expression 'moral turpitude' is not defined in the Village Offices Service Rules, 1969. In fact, the said expression, though occurring in several enactments, does not appear to have been defined anywhere. It, therefore, has led to several varying and sometimes conflicting decisions. The main reason for the difficulty jn defining it and the lack of agreement in that behalf, may perhaps be ascribed to the fact that the concept of moral turpitude may vary according to the community, country, or the times. Many things which were not considered criminal at one time, are now treated as crimes, with the advance of civilisation. But, it can broadly be said that, as a general rule, a crime will be considered as involving moral turpitude if it involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity, when judged in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to the society in general. Every violation of law, it is obvious, does not involve moral turpitude; nor can it be said that a particular category of crimes do necessarily involve, or do not necessarily involve moral turpitude-unless, of course, it is an offence in herently criminal, the very commission of which implies a base and depraved nature. The quantum of punishment is eqully no guide, to wit, a murder punishable with death may not involve moral turpitude. Similarly, the fact that an offence is triable according to summary procedure is not by itself sufficient to say that such an offence cannot involve moral turpitude. Thus it is always a question of fact, to be inferred from the nature of the offence and the circumstances in which the offence was committed.