MALE VENKATASUBBAREDDI Vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR ONGOLE PRAKASAM DISTRICT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The main ground on which the petitioners challenge the notification dated 29th December, 1975 published on 7th January, 1976 in the Gazette made under section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act in regard to the lands belonging to the petitioners in Allakurapadu, Ongole Taluk, Prakasam District is that the notification was not published in the village or in any convenient place in the locality as required by section 4 (1). This allegation is not denied in the counter-affidavit, but it is argued by the learned Government Pleader that the petitioners have come to know of the publication in the Gazette preferred objections and an enquiry was held and ultimately the objections were found to be inadmissible. In these circumstances he submitted that no substantial failure of justice was caused to the petitioners and hence this is not a matter in which the Court should interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(2.) In Narinderjit Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh it was held that when the Collector fails to cause public notice of the substance of the notification to be given at convenient places in the locality the whole acquisition proceedings are vitiated. Following an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan it was held that non-compliance with the above condition makes the acquisition unlawful. Unless both the conditions referred in section 4 are satisfied it cannot be said that the provision is complied with. Referring to an argument that as the provisions of section 5-A were dispensed with, the public notice of the substance of the notification was unnecessary, the Supreme Court observed that the provisions of section 4(1) cannot be held to be mandatory in one situation and directory in another. Section 4 (1) lays down in unequivocal and clear terms that two things have to be done under section 4 (1), namely, the notification has to be published in the official Gazette and the Collector has to cause notice to be given of the substance of the notification at convenient place in the locality. Section 4 (1) has to be read as an integrated provision which contains these two conditions for the purpose of compliance with the provisions of section 4 (1). In that view the Supreme Court quashed the acquisition proceedings. In Kasireddy Papaiah v. State, it was argued before Chinnappa Reddi, J. as has been argued in this case, that the petitioners had full knowledge of the notification under section 4 (1) of the Act. Chinnappa Reddi, J. observed that though in his view there does not appear to be sufficient reason why the failure to comply with the requirement regarding the publication of notice should vitiate the proceedings if the persons for whose benefit publication of notice is required, had full knowledge of it when it was published in the Gazette and though he was inclined to reject the submission of the petitioners he was bound to hold that the proceedings are bad in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan. I agree in entirely with Chinnappa Reddi, J. and I cannot also see why the absence of public notice should vitiate the acquisition when the persons concerned had full knowledge of the proceedings which were published in the Gazette. In this particular case, they had not only knowledge but preferred objections and objections were enquired into and considered. Apart from this, even in such a case, I do not see why the notification under section 4(1) should be quashed. Perhaps the proper order that should be made in such circumstances is to say that the notification will not take effect unless and until notice is given as required under second of part section 4 (1). But this Court is bound by the decision which held that section 4 (1) is an integrated provision and the failure to comply with the second part will vitiate the entire notification and the notification has to be quashed. It therefore, follows that the petitioners contention should prevail and the notification is liable to be quashed.

(3.) The learned Government Pleader however submits that this Court cannot interfere unless that there is substantial failure of justice. He drew my attention to Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the Court may issue a writ-