(1.) The scope and application of Rule 76 of the Village Offices Service Rules 1969 is the principal question that arises for determination in this Writ Petition.
(2.) This writ petition relates to the village headman of Vemali village in Visakhapatnam District. He was a permanent incumbent having been appointed in the year 1968. As many as 12 charges were framed against him by the Sub-Collector, Visakhapatanam. After enquiry the Sub Collector found that the serious charge of misappropriation was not made out and that the village officer was guilty of only certain irregularities. Therefore by her order dated 27-4-1977 the Sab-Collector imposed substantive punishment of suspension for oue year. There was an appeal preferred to the District Revenue Officer of the District by a third party, on which that officer passed an order of removal against the village head-man on 24-3-1971. There was a second appeal to the Board of Revenue preferred by the village headman, whose removal was ordered by the District Revenue Officer, on 20-4-1978. Immediately after completion of one year period of suspension the Land Revenue Commissioner directed the village headman's re-instatement on the bas:s of which he (village headman) took charge of the office on 21-5-1978. Thereafter the Land Revenue Commissioner considered the second appeal. One of the arguments advanced before him on behalf of the removed officer was that Rule 76 of the Village Offices Service Rules does not confer any jurisdiction on the District Revenue Officer to pass any order in the absence of any appeal filed before him. This found acceptance at the hands of the Land Revenue Commissioner, who held that invoking of Rule 76 was incorrect. In that view he set aside the District Revenue Officers' order of removal. The order passed by the Commissioner of Land Revenue on 30 5-1978 further says that having set aside the order of removal passed by the District Revenue Officer, the Commissioner himself thought that the charges levelled against the village headman were serious and therefore he thought it fit to take up the matter, suo motu, in revision, invoking the power vested in him under Rule 75. Having come to this conclusion, so the order says, the Commissioner called upon the petitioner's (village headmen's) counsel to argue the case on merits- In fact the learned counsel was informed by the Commissioner that in case he (counse) wanted time, the matter would be adjourned to give him an opportunity to make his representation as to why punishment of removal or dismissal should not be awarded to the petitioner. The learned counsel however did not want time but argued the case on merits- Having heard the arguments, the Commissioner found that the conclusion of the Sub-Collector that there was no misappropriation was untenable. On examina ion of the evidence he found that the pstitionsr was guilty of charges framed against him. ID view of the graveness of the charges, which were held to be prove J, the Commissioner held that the punishment of suspension for one year was inadequate. He ('Commissioner) enhanced the punishment by ordering that the village headmen be dismissed from service.
(3.) In the present writ petition this order is challenged. Sri E. V. Bhagira- tba Rao, learned counsel for the writ petitioner raises two contentions. Firstly he impugnes the procedure adopted by the commissioner for enhancing the punishment fromone of suspension to one of dissirnissal without issuing notice to the effected village head man personally. In his submission, giving notice to the Advocate, who went to the Commissioner to argue the second appeal against the District Revenue Officer's order of removal is not sufficient. He religes in support of this contention on the provisions of Rules 76. According to him Rule 76 is only a rider, which supplements rule 75 and other preceding provisions relating to appeals and second appeals. Rule 76 requires personal notice to the affected party against whom a punishment is sought to be enhanced to suspension, removal or dismissal. Since that was not done in this case the order of the Commissioner is liable to be set aside.