(1.) As a doubt was entertained whether a decree in terms of the compromise could be passed after this Court has rendered its judgment in the appeal, and an application for leave to appeal to Supreme Court is pending, the learned counsel on both sides placed before us the following authorities on this question.
(2.) In Aghora Kumar Ganguli v. Mohomed Musa, (1910) 5 Ind Cas 723 an appeal was heard by a Divisional Bench of the Calcutta High Court, and leave had been granted to the plaintiff to appeal to His Majesty-in-Council, and at that stage an application was filed for amendment of the decree in so far as it related to costs. One of the contentions raised was that inasmuch as leave had been granted to appeal to the Privy Council, it was not competent to the High Court to amend the decree. Mookerjee and Teunon, JJ., held that that contention was groundless, and that O. 45 R. 13, C. P. C. does not in any way curtail the powers of the High Court in respect of cases in which leave to appeal to the Privy Council had been granted. It was pointed out that Sec. 152 C. P. C. expressly provides that an order for amendment may be made by the High Court at any time and that though leave had been granted the transcript record had not been sent to England. On those grounds it was held that the Court retained jurisdiction to amend the decree.
(3.) The next decision is Braham deo Singh v. Harmanoge Singh (1914) 26 Ind Cas 946 also of the Calcutta High Court. In that case, it was argued that the High Court became functus officio when an appeal to the privy Council was lodged. and therefore, the decree of the High Court could not be amended thereafter. That contention was rejected on the ground that Section 152 C. P. C. empowered the Court to amend the decree at any time.