PRAKASAM K Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner by the District Superintendent of Police, Railways, on 16 April 1950.

(2.) THE petitioner was enlisted as a railway police constable on 31 December 1939 and every since he served at various places. On 13 October, 1948, he was transferred from Vijayawada to Donkonda as station writer at the railway police station. On 12 November, 1948, an incident took place which eventually led to a charge being framed against the petitioner, namely, that he put up a false and vexatious trespass case against a Spencer's waiter at Donakonda. The other incident, which was the subject-matter of the second charge against him was that on 7 February, 1949 he "hushed" up a cognizable offence of the theft of a trunk from a third class compartment. On 7 October, 1949, the petitioner was communicated the charges framed against him and he was asked to submit this explanation with conduct on the two particular occasions he asked for an oral enquiry (sic ). Subsequently, an oral enquiry was conducted with the Deputy Superintendent dent of Police, Railways, as presiding officer. Several witnesses were examined and the petitioner was afforded an adequate opportunity of cross-examining those witnesses. On 13 December, 1949 the District Superintendent of Police sent to the petitioner a memorandum along with the enquiring officer's report setting out the findings reached by him and calling upon the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment, namely, dismissal from service. On 9 January, 1950, the petitioner submitted a petitioner to the District Superintendent of Police requesting him to furnish him with the connected records of the enquiry so as to enable him to submit an explanation. On 3 February, 1950, he was informed by the Superintendent of Police that he was not entitled to peruse the records once again and that he should submit his explanation forthwith. On 10 April, 1950 he submitted his further representation in response cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. On 16 April, 1950, the District Superintendent of Police passed the order dismissing the petitioner from service. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Railways, which was dismissed by an order dated 21 August, 1950. Thereafter the petitioner made a representation to the Inspector-General of Police which was rejected on 15 November, 1950. He preferred a second petition on 11 January, 1951 for review, which was ultimately rejected on 3 March, 1951. His petition to the State of Madras praying for his reinstatement was rejected on 9 October, 1952. After all these, he filed the writ petition in his Court on 28 January 1955. From the statement of the aforesaid facts it is clear that this writ petition was filed about five years after the date of the order dismissing the petitioner from service. Normally, an aggrieved person should seek his remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution within a period of six months. The petitioner has not given any satisfactory explanation for his inordinate delay of nearly five years in seeking the remedy. This by itself, should be sufficient to deny the petitioner any relief. That apart, there is the further fact that no statutory requirement has been violated. The constitutional protection guaranteed under Art. 311 has been fully complied with. The petitioner was afforded a reasonable opportunity on the earlier occasion for cross-examining the witnesses and participating in the enquiry and submitting his explanation. Thereafter, the District Superintendent of Police sent him the record of enquiry and he was asked to show cause against the action proposed to be taken. He furnished his explanation again. It is, therefore, clear that both the opportunities have been afforded to the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner cannot very well complain of any infringement of any statutory rights.

(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has complained that the officer concerned has not properly appreciated the evidence. On a careful consideration of the material before him, he officer came to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the charge framed against him. This is a finding of fact which will not be interfered with by this Court in a writ proceeding.