P. PRABHAKAR REDDY Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These civil revision petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution arise out of the order dated 28.11.2016 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Kadapa, in I.A.No.763 of 2015 in S.R.No.2764 of 2015 in A.A.No.1 of 1998. The State of Andhra Pradesh and officers of its Roads and Buildings Department (hereinafter, 'the authorities'), the petitioners in the subject I.A., filed C.R.P.No.2637 of 2017 aggrieved thereby, while C.R.P.No.787 of 2017 was filed by the Contractor, the first respondent in the said I.A. The second respondent is the sole Arbitrator. The I.A. was filed by the authorities under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1963') to condone the delay and to number the main petition filed by them under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1996'), to set aside Arbitration Award No.1 of 1998 passed by the second respondent.

(2.) By the order under revision, the Court below allowed the I.A. in part, condoning the delay under Section 14 of the Act of 1963, while holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the main petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The Court below opined that the Principal District Court at Chittoor alone had jurisdiction to entertain the main petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, in the light of Section 42 thereof, as execution proceedings in E.P.No.5 of 2014 were already instituted before it by the Contractor. The authorities are aggrieved by this finding of the Court below while the Contractor is aggrieved by the fact that the Court below, despite holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the main petition, condoned the delay in its presentation under Section 14 of the Act of 1963.

(3.) As regards the latter aspect, the learned Special Government Pleader representing the learned Advocate General, State of Andhra Pradesh, appearing for the authorities, would fairly concede that if the Court below was of the opinion that it lacked jurisdiction, it had no power to even condone the delay, as such lack of jurisdiction would be all pervasive and would not clothe the Court below with even the limited power of condoning such delay. Therefore, C.R.P.No.787 of 2017 would necessarily have to be allowed in the event we agree with the Court below that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the main petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The issue that falls for consideration is whether the Court below was correct in concluding so.