CHADALAVADA KRISHNA MURTHY Vs. VINOD BAID AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I.A.No.2 of 2018 in A.A.No.86 of 2013 is an application filed by the respondent in the Arbitration Application praying that this Court be pleased to grant extension of time to the Arbitrator for completion of the arbitral proceedings and for passing an award. Reference is also made in the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.2 of 2018 to the fact that the learned Arbitrator has addressed a letter to this Court seeking extension of time for completion of arbitral proceedings and the said letter is also pending consideration. The records include the letter, dated 12.01.2018 of Justice Dalava Subrahmanyam, former Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, addressed to the Registrar General of this Court. Having regards to the contents thereof, I deem it appropriate that a copy of the said letter stands appended as an Annexure to this order. It is so directed.

(2.) The plea in the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.2 of 2018 seeking extension of time is in terms of the contents of the letter of the learned Arbitrator. Apart from that, the affidavit also makes reference to the decision of A.A.M.P.No.1158 of 2017, which was filed as an application in A.A.No.86 of 2013. That application was disposed of by this Court on 13.04.2018 holding that the challenge levied by the applicant in the said A.A.M.P.No.1158 of 2017 questioning the authority of the Arbitrator is not sustainable before the High Court and such plea would lie only before Court as defined in Section 2(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for short, the Act.

(3.) The first respondent in I.A.No.2 of 2018, who was the applicant in A.A.No.86 of 2013, has filed counter affidavit raising the plea that an application for enlargement of time can be sustained only under Section 29A of the Act following the insertion of that provision by Act 3 of 2016 with retrospective effect, with effect from 23.10.2015 and that such application would lie only before the Court as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. It is contended that this High Court is not a Court under Section 2(e) of the Act as so amended. It is also pleaded that by efflux of time, the Arbitrator has lost his mandate, particularly on the basis of various factors pleaded in that counter affidavit sworn to on behalf of the first respondent on 15.06.2018.