K GANNA REDDY Vs. GOVERNMENT OF A P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Appellant has preferred this appeal aggrieved by the order passed in w. P. No. 22038 of 2007 dated 6. 12. 2007 whereby the petitioner's request, that the order of the 1st respondent in G. O. Rt. No. 1284 dated 6. 10. 2007 be quashed, was rejected. The appellant herein was appointed as the Chairman of the A. P. Agricultural Market Committee, Suryapet on 18. 11. 2005. On his being removed from office, by order of the 1st respondent in G. O. Rt. No. 1284 dated 6. 10. 2007, the appellant invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the constitution of India. He contended before this Court that the 6th respondent was his political rival, that both of them were in the fray for appointment as chairman of the Agricultural Market Committee, Surypet, that the 6th respondent bore a grudge against him and lodged a complaint on 4. 10. 2006 alleging 11 irregularities against him, that the complaint was forwarded to the 2nd respondent for initiation of action, that the 5th respondent, who was appointed as the enquiry officer by the 2nd respondent, conducted an enquiry and submitted his report, that as he was not issued a copy thereof, he submitted a representation on 9. 7. 2007 requesting that copies of both the complaint and the enquiry report be furnished and he be given an opportunity to submit his explanation thereto, that he filed W. P. No. 15623 of 2007 and this Court, by order dated 24. 7. 2007, dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn giving him the liberty to work out his remedies as and when the cause of action arose, thereafter notice dated 27. 7. 2007 was issued calling for his explanation and he was asked to show cause why he should not be removed from the office of Chairman, agricultural Market Committee, Suryapet. W. P. No. 15740 of 2007 filed by the appellant, challenging the show cause notice dated 27. 7. 2007, was dismissed by order dated 10. 8. 2007 and the appellant was given liberty to submit his explanation to the show cause notice. This Court further held that, if any adverse order was passed, it should not come into force for a period of 10 days from the date of service of the order. The appellant submitted his explanation on 18. 8. 2007, inter-alia, contending that the four allegations held established related mainly to the revocation of the order suspending the licenses of traders, that the decision to revoke the licences was not his individual but a collective decision taken pursuant to the resolutions of the Market Committee and that, for such collective decisions, he could not be held individually responsible. Thereafter, the impugned order came to be passed.

(2.) BEFORE the Learned Single Judge, the appellant contended that the impugned order was vague, that it did not specify which statutory rule was violated by the appellant, that Rule 52 (2) mandated issuance of a show cause notice to the licensee before the licence was cancelled or suspended and it was evident therefrom that, if a reply was submitted by the licensee and the market committee was satisfied with the reply, it was bound to revoke the order of suspension. The appellant contended that it was the duty of the 4th respondent to enter the resolutions by circulation in the next meeting agenda and, for the lapse on the part of the 4th respondent, he could not be held responsible. The appellant pointed out that, even otherwise, the allegations regarding the effect of the market committee passing the resolutions by circulation, was not mentioned in the show cause notice, but was reflected only in the final order. The appellant also contended that the Government did not form the requisite opinion regarding the allegation of violation of statutory rules, that the opinion as required under Section 5 (5) of the Act was lacking and the impugned order was, therefore, liable to be quashed.

(3.) THE learned Single Judge, in the order under appeal, held that the mere fact that, in the impugned order, the opinion of the 2nd respondent had been referred to would not by itself mean that there was no independent application of mind by the Government, that the term "wilful" would have to be appreciated in the context of the background of a given case and the charges relating to the abuse of office while exercising the power, that it may have to be taken that the action of the appellant was deliberate and that it should be taken as "nothing short of wilful". The Learned Single Judge observed that, when certain reasons had been recorded by the Government and in the light of the limitations placed on the Court as a writ court while exercising certiorari jurisdiction, he was satisfied that the writ petition was devoid of merits.