(1.) THE unsuccessful defendant in O. S. No. 51 of 1983 on the file of the subordinate Judge, Amalapuram, had preferred the present appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree made therein directing the appellant-defendant to execute a regular registered sale deed and deliver possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff within a period of three months granting relief of specific performance.
(2.) THE said suit for specific performance was instituted on the strength of an agreement of sale dated 03. 6. 1982 executed by the appellant-defendant. The execution of the said agreement of sale dated 03. 6. 1982 marked as Ex. A-2 is not in serious controversy. However, the appellant-defendant had taken a specific stand that the said agreement of sale cannot be enforced, since the plaint schedule property is the joint family property of appellant-defendant and his sons and the sons are not parties to the said Ex. A-2 and, hence, the same is not enforceable and incidentally certain other pleas also had been raised. The trial court, on appreciation of the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4, D. Ws. 1 and 2 and also Exs. A-1 to a-17 and Ex. B-1 and Ex. B-2 came to the conclusion that in the light of the recitals in Ex. A-1 the plaint schedule property was the self acquired property of the appellant-defendant and hence non-joining of the sons in execution of ex. A-2 may not seriously alter the situation and accordingly decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal was preferred by the unsuccessful defendant.
(3.) CONTENTIONS of Sri M. V. Suresh: sri M. V. Suresh, learned counsel representing the appellant had taken this court through the respective pleadings of the parties and the evidence available on record and would maintain that the circumstances under which Ex. A-2 was signed by the appellant-defendant had not been taken into consideration. The learned counsel also would maintain that the theory of blending as laid down by the Hindu law had not been considered in proper perspective. The learned counsel also would maintain that the conduct of the parties and also the documentary evidence apart from the oral evidence would clearly go to show that these properties were never treated as separate properties of the appellant-defendant, but always were treated as joint family members and, hence, without the sons being consenting parties to such transaction, the agreement of sale cannot be said to be binding on the other co-parceners of the joint family. While elaborating his submissions the learned counsel also pointed out that ex. B-1 and Ex. A-16 also had not been considered in proper perspective and the recitals of Ex. A-1 would go to show that it is not as though rights had been given only to the appellant-defendant and defendant alone, but the heirs and successors in interest also had been given the rights and this was not appreciated in proper perspective. The counsel also had taken this Court through the evidence of P. W. 1, P. W. 2, P. W. 3 and P. W. 4 and also D. W. 1 and D. W. 2 as well apart from the documentary evidence. While further elaborating his submissions the learned counsel also would maintain that to substantiate the plea of blending, always documentary evidence is not necessary, even oral evidence may be sufficient. The learned counsel laid emphasis on Ex. B-1 and ex. A-2 and also pointed to Sections 17 and 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and would maintain that this is a case of absence of title and, hence, relief of specific performance cannot be granted. Certain admissions of P. W. 1 also had been pointed out and the learned counsel also relied on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions.