(1.) AS the point involved in all these appeals and the parties are one and the same, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.
(2.) FACTS , in brief, are: Appellant- complainant is the owner of a land in an extent of Acs. 6-20 guntas, situated in the property bearing No. 19-3-528, Jahanuma, Hyderabad, which was divided into plots of various sizes in pursuance of G. O. Ms. No. 762, Revenue (UC. III) Department dated 30. 8. 1991. The respondent-accused, who is a dealer in real estates, purchased some plots from the appellant and agreed to register the same in the name of his nominees and accordingly issued 35 cheques in the name of the appellant as Managing Director of M/s. Southern Movietone Limited and in the name of the appellant for different amounts on behalf of his nominees, in all amounting to Rs. 17,33,960.00 towards sale consideration and development charges to an extent of 5376 square yards. Subsequently, on presentation of the cheques bearing Nos. 275284, 275288, 275286, 275284 and 275282, dated 23. 9. 1993, for Rs. 2,50,000.00, Rs. 2,50,000.00, Rs. 2,25,000.00, Rs. 2,50,000.00 and Rs. 3,20,000.00 respectively drawn on State Bank of India, Idibar branch through his banker, Vysya Bank Limited, Uppal for collection on 7. 3. 1994, the same were dishonoured with an endorsement "insufficient funds" and the same was informed to the appellant orally on 8. 3. 1994 and in writing on 9. 3. 1994. Thereupon, the appellant prepared notices on 8. 3. 1994 and sent the same to the respondent by registered post with acknowledgment due on 10. 3. 1994 demanding payment. But, the respondent having received the notices on 15. 3. 1994 has failed to comply with the demand. In those circumstances, the appellant filed private complainants being C. C. No. 369 of 1994, C. C. No. 770 of 1995, C. C. No. 768 of 1995, C. C. No. 769 of 1995 and C. C. No. 371 of 1994 against the respondent - accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the Act' ).
(3.) HEARD learned Counsel for the appellant and learned Counsel for the respondent.