LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER Vs. LAL NAIK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only contest in this appeal by the State is against the award of additional amount under sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said sub-section was introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (Central Act 68 of 1984).

(2.) The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 9-12-1981. Even much earlier, possession of the land in question was taken on 1-11-1975 probably to hasten the work relating to excavation of Kakatiya Canal. The award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 27-3-1985. On a reference under Section 18 of the Act, by the judgment dated 8-8-1986, the Subordinate Judge, Jagtial enhanced the compensation and granted the benefit of additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Act in addition to other statutory benefits. The additional amount under Sec.23(l-A) of the Act at 12% per annum was awarded for the period between the date of notification under Section 4(1) and the date of award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. It is with reference to that amount of Rs.23,410/-, the present appeal is filed.

(3.) Relying on the language of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the Act, the learned Government Pleader wants us to hold that the said sub-section is not attracted and the additional amount contemplated by the sub-section cannot be awarded to the respondents. In order to appreciate this contention which borders on extremity, we would like to extract sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act: "In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier." The argument of the learned Government Pleader runs thus: As the words employed are "whichever is earlier", the event of taking possession being earlier to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, nothing can be awarded to the claimant under sub-section (1-A). It is only if the date of taking possession is subsequent to Section 4(1) notification, the benefit can be given to the claimant. On a literal reading of the section, this contention may at best be considered plausible. But, in order to avoid incongruous and unjust consequences that would otherwise follow and to give a sensible meaning to the provision in harmony with the objective of the amendment, we cannot give effect to the contention advanced by the learned Government Pleader. If the date of taking possession is earlier to the date of Section 4(1) notification, in our view, the date of the award should be taken as the crucial date. That means, where the date of taking possession precedes Section 4(1) notification, there will be no occasion to apply the words "whichever is earlier" and they become pro tanto inapplicable. It is only if the date of taking possession follows the date of Section 4(1) notification, the words "whichever is earlier" will have their full play and intended effect. Where in a case like this, the possession of the land was taken over long prior to Section 4(1) notification, The starting point is the date of publication of notification and the terminus is the award of the Collector. It is between these two dates the additional market value under sub-Section (1-A) will accrue to the claimant. Sub-Section (1-A) speaks of two termini one is the date of award and the other is the date of taking possession. Whereas the first one invariably follows the date of publication of notification, the second one may or may not. It cannot be said that unless the second contingency also occurs after the date of notification, the provision as a whole becomes unworkable. Any such interpretation would result in an unjust situation of the claimant being denied of market value if the possession was taken over from him rather illegally even prior to the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings. We would like to avoid an interpretation having the potentiality of visiting a law-abiding ryot who voluntarily surrenders possession of his land at the request of the authorities concerned with a disadvantage and we would prefer to give an interpretation which advances the objective of the provision. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention put forward by the learned Government Pleader.