(1.) The relief claimed in this petition is for a direction to Respondent No.4, Executive Officer, to allow the petitioner to manage the temple of Sri Laxmi Venkateshwara Swamy, Manyamkonda, Mahaboobnagar District. The question that falls for consideration is as to the true appreciation of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pannalal Bansilal Patil v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1996 SC 1023 as regards the power of management of the hereditary trustee or the successor in interest of the founder to mange the institution during the period before any Trust Board is constituted. As the learned Single Judge differed with the view taken by Justice Maruthi in Writ Petition No.16070 of 1996 holding that the hereditary trustee is entitled to manage the temple in case there are no allegations against him, and that the Executive Officer is not automatically authorised to administer the institution, this case has been referred to the Division Bench. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner's ancestor was the founder of the temple and the petitioner is continuing as the hereditary trustee. The learned Government Pleader for Endowments submits that there are no allegations of mis-management or misappropriation against the petitioner. It is the petitioner's case that after the decision of the Supreme Court upholding of provisions of Section 16 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, (for short 'the Act') abolishing the hereditary trusteeship, the petitioner is not being allowed by Respondent No.4, the Executive Officer, to manage the temple. The Honourable Justice P. Ramakrishnam Raju in his reference order has taken the view that even though the petitioner can become the Chairman of the Trust Board when it is formed, yet there is no warrant to suppose that the hereditary trustee, can himself carry on the functions of the Trust Board even when it is not formed. The view taken was that in the absence of a Trust Board, the petitioner should have asked for it constitution under the provisions of the Act and stake his claim to be the Chairman, but to assume all the powers of the Trust Board for himself in the absence of a Trust Board cannot be countenanced, as such an assumption cannot be justified in the light of the provisions of the Act and the judgment of the Supreme Court.
(2.) Admittedly the petitioner has continued as the sole hereditary trustee of the temple. No Trust Board had yet been constituted. On the enactment of Section 16 of the Act the hereditary trusteeship stood abolished. The provision was questioned before the Supreme Court which upheld its constitutional validity.
(3.) Submission is advanced on behalf of the Respondent No.4, the Executive Officer, that no consideration has been made in the judgment as to the process of management of the institution during the period the hereditary trustreeship stands abolished and the Trust Board is not constituted. While it is the case of the petitioner that during such period it is his right to manage the temple, it is the case of Respondent No.4 that on the abolition of hereditary trusteeship he automatically takes over the management. A careful reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court does not support the contention of the learned Counsel for Respondent No.4. Paragraph (26) of the judgment is as follows :