S BASHEER AHMED CHIRALA Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Criminal Revision Case is filed by Accused No. 1,2 and 3 against the order of the I Additional District Munsif, Cuddapah, dated 4-11-1996 passed on his file in Crl.M.P.No. 1153 of 1996 in C.CNo. 164 of 1996. The Court below has rejected the said Crl.M.P.No. 1153/96 filed by the petitioners. It is to be noted at this stage itself that the petitioners were charge-sheeted for the offences u/s. 3,4 and 6 of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and under Section 498 (A) of I.P.C. The petitioners filed the said Cr.M.P. for discharging and acquitting them of the alleged offences in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a decision in "Common Cause A Registered Society, vs. Union of India", but by the impugned order the Court below has rejected that Crl.M.P. Hence, the petitioners have preferred this present Criminal Revision Case.

(2.) The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously contended that the impugned order is illegal and contrary to the Judgment of the Supreme Court (1) supra and the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court dated 28-11-1996 in "Common Cause A Registered Society vs. Union of India" on the basis of which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has issued a Circular dated 23-12-1996 in ROC.NO. 976/96/O.P. Cell-E-II.

(3.) I have given very anxious consideration to the case. It is not in dispute in this case that on the basis of the complaint filed by Sahira Banu, the wife of the accused No. 1, alleging that A-1 and his parents A-2 and A-3 were harassing her and demanding her to bring more dowry, police have registered the case in Crime No. 33/91 and later filed a charge-sheet on 21-8-91 and the Court below took cognizance of the offence on 5-9-91 and thereafter the case was posted on 27-9-19 for appearance of the accused petitioners. Meanwhile petitioners preferred a Criminal Petition before this Court for quashing the proceedings, in Crl.P.No. 734/93 there was an interim order granted by the High Court by staying the proceedings on 10-3-1993 and latter the said interim order of stay was vacated on 27-4-1994. Thereafter, the petitioners again filed Criminal Petition No. 325/95 for not discharging them. In that case also the Hon'ble High Court granted stay on 13-6-95 and the same was subsequently vacated on 25-7-1995. These facts are not disputed in-the case. But the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that a case is pending for the last 5 years and the trial has not commenced and as per the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1) supra particularly under para (f) of the directions the petitioners are entitled to be discharged of the offences under Sections 3,4 & 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which are punishable with an imprisonment for not more than two years. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the Court below has erred in holding that the delay in the disposal of the case was due to non-co-operation of the accused persons. He further submitted that in fact the delay in the disposal of the case cannot be attributable to the accused. The petitioners nodoubt obtained stay in Crl.M.P.No. 734/93 on 10-3-93 but the same was vacated on 27-4-94. Even the stay granted in favour of the petitioners in Crl.P.No. 325 of 1995 on 13-6-95 was vacated on 25-7-95. Thus, the total delay on account of the petitioners obtaining stay was not more than one year and three months in all and in fact the petitioners were examined under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. on 3-1-92 and charge was also framed in the month of January '1992 and absolutely there was no explanation on the part of the prosecution for the delay in the disposal of the case/Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to be discharged and acquitted of the offences. I am afraid, this contention of the learrted Counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted for more than one reason. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide judgment and order dated 28-11-96 in W.P.Civil No. 1128 of 1986 has clarified the earlier Judgment of the Supreme Court in (1) supra. By the earlier judgment the Supreme Court made it clear in paragraph No. 4 of its judgment that the directions contained under Clauses 1 and 2 shall not apply to cases of offences involving