(1.) This is a ease in which the respondent-plaintiff is claiming archaka of Sri Nukalammavari temple, situated in Market Street, Kakinada for more than 25 years on the ground that her mother Chokka Pydamma was also the archaka of the same temple, and that before her mother, her grandmother Ambai Nookamma was the archaka, and prior to that Mosa Venkayamma, the mother of Ambai Nookamma was the archaka. She is also trying to assert that they were performing rites in the temple as hereditary archakas and were enjoying the offerings, according to the prevalent custom for generations as archakas
(2.) Hereditary archaka has been deplored by the Apex Court in the case of A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, in which the Supreme Court observed that the services of the priest (archaka) is a secular part. The right to perform religious service has appointment by the owner of the temple or king as its source, and their Legislature is competent to enact the law taking away the hereditary right to succeed to an office in the temple and equally to the office of the priest (archaka). The Supreme Court further observed that the hereditary right as such was not an integral part of the religious practice but a source to secure the services of a priest independent of it. Therefore, when the hereditary right to perform service in the temple was terminated by an owner for bad conduct, its abolition by sovereign legislature was equally valid and legal. Regulation of his service conditions was sequenced to the abolition of hereditary right of succession of the office of an archaka. Though an archaka integrity associates himself with the performance of ceremonies rituals and daily pooja to the Deity, he was the holder of the office of priest in the temple and so were the other office-holders or employees of the temple. Though archaka was normally a well-versed and accomplished person in the Agamas and rituals necessary to be performed in a temple,he was the holder of an office in the temple. He was subject to the disciplinary power of a trustee or an appropriate authority prescribed in the regulations or rules of the Act. He owed his existence to an order of appointment-be it in writing or otherwise. Though after appointment, as an integral part of the daily rituals, he performed worship in accordance with the Agama Sastras, it was no ground to hold that his appointment was either a religious practice or a matter of religion. It was not an essential part of religion or matter of religion or religious practice and, therefore, the Supreme Court held that abolition of the hereditary rights to appointment under Section 34 was not violative of either Article 25(1) or 26(b) of the Constitution of India.
(3.) The right claimed by Respondent No.1 as hereditary archaka is not only hit by the decision of the Supreme Court cited above, but also under Section 34 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act,1987, which provides for Abolition of hereditary rights in Mirasidars, Archakas, and other office holders and servants. The said Section reads as follows: