LAWS(APH)-1997-9-172

I SUDHIR REDDY Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Decided On September 25, 1997
INDUPUR SUDHIR REDDY Appellant
V/S
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESHREP., BY PRL.SECRETARY TO GOVT., REVENUE DEPARTMENT, HYDERABAD Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question strenuously urged in this appeal is the entitlement of a minor son in a coparcenary who has become major after the notified date of the Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to a separate ceiling for himself under the Act. Though the question has been answered in the negative by a Bench decision of this Court in C.R.P.No. 1851 and 2042 of 1990, dated 28-8-1997, yet the claim of the petitioner, as submitted by the learned senior Counsel Sri M.V. Ramana Reddy appearing for him, on the plea of the Act though included in the IX Schedule of the Constitution yet does not have the immunity provided under Article 31-B of the Constitution of India, and that determination of ceiling without giving an independent ceiling to him amounts to compulsory acquisition of land within the ceiling area without paying market value compensation and hence for the reason the provision of determination of ceiling is hit by the second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution, was not considered in the earlier judgment. Hence, we decided to hear the matter and come to an independent conclusion.

(2.) The scheme of the Act has been well exposed in the previous judgment, but for our purpose here it needs elucidation here that after the declaration is filed under Section 8 of the Act, the Tribunal decides the existence or otherwise of excess land over the the ceiling entitlement and thereafter steps are to be taken by the Tribunal by serving notice under Section 10 (2) to direct surrender of the land. On receipt of the notice, the notice (sic. land holder) has to decide his option by filing a statement as to the lands to be retained by him, which if accepted by the Tribunal, an order shall bepassed accordingly. If the person fails to file the statement or files an incomplete statement, the Tribunal after giving opportunity to the person concerned itself makes the selection of the lands to be surrendered. In either case, after the order of the Tribunal is passed, the land is deemed to have been surrendered. Section 11 makes the provision that where any land is surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered, the Revenue Divisional Officer is to take possession or authorise any officer to take possession of the surrendered land and that such land shall thereupon vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is on the basis of such scheme of the Act the argument is made that as vesting in the Government does not take place until possession has been taken, the land continues, before the vesting, in the family of the land holder with their title to it and if by the time the land is taken possession of, any minor son has become major, he becomes entitled to another ceiling independent of his father by virtue of having independent title to the land. Either such ceiling is to be released to him with an opportunity, to select his own lands or if the land is taken possession of, it has to be done only by payment of market value compensation. In developing the submission reliance has been placed on a Full Bench Judgment in M. Venkateswara Rao vs. State wherein the vires of the Act was considered. In paragraph 155 of the judgment at page 346 the judgment recorded that in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Kunjukutty vs. State of Kerala (AIR 1972 SC 2097) the learned Advocate General conceded that the provisions of Section 7 or Section 10 (5) (ii) read with Explanation to Section 3 (i) of the Act might offend the second proviso to Article 31-A (1) of the Constitution. However, the vires of the Act was upheld only because of its inclusion in the IX Schedule of the Constitution of India. The argument is further developed to contend that the Supreme Court decided in Keshavananda Bharathi vs. State of Kerala that the immunity under Article 31-B of the Constitution to the Acts included in the IX Schedule was available only to the Acts that were included in the Schedule upto the date of the judgment i.e., 24-4-1973 but that subsequent inclusions did not have such an immunity if they violate the basic structure of the Constitution. According to Mr. Ramana Reddy since the impugned Act violates the basic structure of the Constitution, its provisions are not immune from challenge as being violative of second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution.

(3.) The argument though ingenious yet does not survive beyond surface. As was explained in the earlier judgment in the C.R.P., ceiling is determined only with reference to the notified date. The ceiling in respect of units, either family or otherwise, has to be so fixed, since otherwise, the entire scheme of land reforms would become an indefinitely futile exercise. Law has visualised a scheme to put a finality to the rights of the parties in respect of agricultural lands held by them and draws an artificial date bar after which all rights shall stand extinguished and the surplus lands so collected are to be distributed amongst the landless persons. This scheme of the Act is designed to achieve agrarian reform which itself is one of the objectives borne out of Directive Principles of State policy. If the submission of the learned Counsel is accepted, it would mean no land to be finally determined as vested in the State and available for distribution. The mere incidental fact of notice under Sec. 10 (2) to have been given at a belated stage, which factor occasioned a minor son to become a major in the mean time, cannot entitle him to claim a ceiling for himself as that would be against the canons of the statute itself and would be giving a premium to the inaction either of the Tribunal to give notice or decide or of the Revenue Divisional Officer to take possession of the land. In such a case, it would be obviously possible for an interested person to manage delay in issue of notice under Section 10 (2) or of taking possession and then come forward with the case that as the vesting has taken place at a time after his becoming a major, he is entitled to frustrate the provisions of the Act to his benefit.