DILIP KUMAR Vs. K SHANKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff in O.S. No.15 of 1996 on the file of the District Munsif, Medak, is the petitioner. His father was initially the tenant and the father of the 1st respondent and the grand-father of the 2nd respondent and the father-in-law of the 3rd respondent, was the landlord of the premises. The premises was obtained on lease on executing a lease deed dt.12-9-1971, on a monthly rent basis and the father of the petitioner started a Saw-Mill business therein. After his father's death, the petitioner has been in possession of the premises by paying monthly rent to the respondents, who became the absolute owners after the death of the father of the 1st respondent. Alleging that the respondents threatened the petitioner to close the business and vacate the premises, the petitioner filed the suit for perpetual injunction and pending the suit he filed LA. No.65/96 seeking temporary injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the premises. The trial Court granted the temporary injunction. The respondents carried the matter in appeal in C.M. A. No.8/96 before the Subordinate Judge, Medak, who, having considered the material on record, allowed the C.M.A. and dismissed the I.A. Challenging the order passed in the C.M.A., the petitioner filed this revision petition.

(2.) It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the respondents cannot interfere with the possession of the premises by the petitioner without resorting to the due procedure of issuing notice u/Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminating the tenancy and they cannot be allowed to take the law into their hands.

(3.) Learned Counsel for the respondents urged that no injunction can be granted against true owners. It is the case of the petitioner himself that he has agreed to vacate the premises and in that direction he has taken steps for shifting the machinery etc., to the new premises, which indicates that there was an agreement entered into by the petitioner with the respondents agreeing to vacate the premises and as per Ex.B-2 he agreed to vacate the premises by February, 1996. In view of the above agreement, the petitioner ceased to be a tenant and he was staying in the premises with the consent of the landlord upto February, 1996. Hence, the question of termination of tenancy by resorting to Sec.106 of T.P. Act does not arise. He cited several decisions in support of his contention.