(1.) In a land acquisition case, the land outers (petitioners) of Ac.2-00 in Survey No.l27/16A of Gollapuram village, Hindupur mandal, Anantapur district, are challenging the land acquisition proceedings mainly on the ground that the proceedings are vitiated on account of award not having been passed during the prescribed period of two years from the last date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act').
(2.) While furnishing particulars of the publication of notices as required by law, the learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare and Labour, brought to the attention of the Court that declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published in the Gazette on 8-5-1994 and in the concerned locality it was published on 9-6-1994. The Award was declared on 25-5-1996. Hence, there was no question of the proceedings having been vitiated because from 9-6-1994 which was the last date of publication, the passing of the award which took place of 25-5-1996 fell within the prescribed limit of two years.
(3.) However, Shri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the last date of publication of the declaration had to be considered not from the date on which the declaration was published in the locality of the land sought to be acquired, but from the date of publication in the Gazette which was done on 8-5-1994. The award passed on 25-5-1996, therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, was beyond the time limit of two years prescribed by law. In support of his submissions Mr. Manohar Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Jakrand Singh, 1995 (2) SCC page 497, in which the Supreme Court made its observations in paragraph 5 as under : "5. Clause (i) of the proviso to Section 6(1) mandates the publication of the declaration in the Official Gazette and it should be within three years from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) i.e., the last of the dates referred to in Section 4(1). The word 'publish' emphasises the act accomplished i.e., declaration under Section 6(1) being published in the Official Gazette. The last date under Section 6(2) shall be the date for the purposes "hereinafter referred to" would be not for computing the period of three years prescribed in clause (i) of proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act as it was already done, but purposes to be followed hereinafter. Otherwise language would have been "hereinbefore done". Sub-section (2) as such did not prescribe any limitation within which the declaration under Section 6(1) or other steps hereinafter to be taken, in other words, the steps to be taken thereafter in making the award under Section 11 or in computation of the period prescribed in Section 11 A. The publication of the declaration in two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality one of which is in the regional language and the publication of the substance of the declaration in the locality are ministerial acts and is a procedural part. It appears that these publications are required to be done to make the declaration published in the manner, to be conclusive evidence of the public purpose under Section 6(1) and also to provide limitation to make the award under Section 11 by the Collector. In other words, the limitation prescribed under Section 11A is for the purpose of making the award and if the Collector fails to do so, the entire procedure under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) shall stand lapsed. If this consistent policy of the Act is understood giving teeth to the operational efficacy to the scheme of the Act and public purpose the Act seeks to serve, we are of the considered view that publication in the Gazette already made under clause (i) of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 is complete, as soon as the declaration under Section 6(1) was published in the Official Gazette. That will be the date for the purpose of computation of three years' period from the last of the dates of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). The procedural ministerial acts prescribed under sub-section (2) are only for the purpose of the procedure to be followed 'hereinafter', in other words, the steps to be taken subsequent to the publication of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. We cannot agree with Shri Rana, the learned Senior Counsel, that the date of making the declaration by the Secretary to the Government or the authorised officer is the date for computing period of three years. Equally, we cannot agree with the learned Counsel for the respondents, Shri Upadhyay, that publication of the substance being the last date from which the period of three years needs to be computed. Acceptance of either contention would easily defeat the public policy under the Act by skilful manner of management with the lower level officials. The High Court, therefore, was not right in its conclusion that since declaration was published in the newspapers on 4-6-1987, after the expiry of three years, the declaration under Section 6(1) and the notification under Section 4(1) stood lapsed. It is clearly illegal. The further contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that other contention raised hi the writ petitions needs to be dealt with and so the cases need to be remanded, has no force for the reason that though they were pleaded but the parties have chosen to argue only the above contention. So it is not a fit case for remand. The writ petitions would stand dismissed The appeals arc accordingly allowed but in the circumstances without costs."