PERTECH COMPUTERS Vs. CONTROLLER OF LEGAL METROLOGY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition is filed against the show cause notice dated 6-10-1995 by which the Inspector of Legal Metrology, Nirmal informing the petitioner mat the advertisement given by the petitioner in respect of certain Computers in the issue of Deccan Chronicle dated 6-9-1995 offended the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 inasmuch as the length of the Monitor was given in inches and not in standard metric units. He also stated that this offence can be compounded by paying a sum of Rs.2,000/-. The case of the petitioner's is that the length is also given in metric units, the length in inches has been given within the brackets only for the customers to have a better understanding due to the familarity with that measurement.

(2.) No counter has been filed by the respondents. I have read Section 33 of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 which prohibits quotations, announcements and advertisements otherwise than in terms of standard units. But it does not prohibit the analogous measurement being given for proper understanding by the customers. The prohibition will operate only if the measurement is given in terms other than standard units without any reference to the standard units. But in the present case where the advertisement gives it in standard units and also gives more familiar measurements in inches, I do not think that there is any violation of the prohibition of Section 33 of the Act. In any case, it will be a violation which is venial in character. The Supreme Court has held in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC) that whether the penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all relevant circumstances and that even if a minimum penalty is prescribed the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose a penalty when there is a mere technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act.

(3.) In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the impugned notice is outside the scope of the Section 33 of the Act as there is no factual foundation to confer jurisdiction on the respondents to initiate proceedings for punishing the petitioner under Section 33 of the Act. The impugned notice is therefore quashed.