CEMENT AGENCIES VIJAYAWADA Vs. VIJAYA BABU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This criminal appeal is filed aggrieved by the orders of acquittal passed by the IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada in C.C. 829/94. The complainant preferred this appeal. In the said judgment the Magistrate held that the complainant failed to prove that the cheque in question was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable liability and acquitted the respondent.

(2.) Smt.K.Amruthavalli, Managing Partner, the complainant, is represented by her General Power of Attorney holder Mr. Sundarasivarao has filed the complaint in the Court. The facts of the case are that the respondent was having account with the appellant for supply of cement and a khatha is being maintained in his account in the appellant company. By the end of the financial year 1993-94 an amount of Rs.16,790/- is payable by the accused and in discharge of the said amount he issued cheque bearing No.526322 dated 26-7-94 Ex.P3. On presentation of the same for encashment the cheque was returned on 30-07-94 with an endorsement 'exceeds arrangements'. Thereafter the appellant got issued a legal notice Ex.P6 on 2-8-94 and the accused also sent his reply Ex.P7 on 10-08-94 wherein the khatha and the amount payable by him was admitted but at the same time he categorically stated that certain incentives are due from the appellant company and unless and until the accounts are settled the question of paying the amounts does not arise. It was further stated in the reply notice that the cheque in question was issued only for security purpose and not in discharge of any debt. Thereafter the present complaint was filed to prove his case. The appellant got three witnesses examined and marked Exs.P1 to P 8 and the accused got himself examined as DW 1 and another witness as DW2 and got marked Exs.Dl to D9. It was also stated in the reply notice that on 04-10-91 he issued blank cheques bearing Nos. 526319, 526320, 526321 and 526322 and the same were acknowledged on the counterfoils and the appellant signed in proof of receipt of the cheques on 04-10-91 and the same are marked under Exs.D1 to D4. It is the case of the accused that he issued blank cheques on 04-10-91 and the complainant acknowledged on the counterfoils and the same were given as security. But the appellant in the witness box denied the endorsement but he admitted the signatures on the counterfoils. The question that arise for consideration would be about the validity period of a cheque under proviso to Section 138 of N.I. Act by which Act the cheque has to be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier. However, learned Counsel for the appellant has addressed elaborate argument by relying on Section 20 of the N.I. Act and contended that once a blank cheque comes into the possession of the holder he is entitled to put any date he likes and any amount he likes and the other gaps as the holder of the cheque. In support of his contention he drew my attention to Section 20 of the N.I. Act. I need not go into that controversy as the issue before me is only whether the holder of the cheque can present the cheque nearly after four years by relying on Section 20 of the Act which is time barred. Though learned Counsel for the appellant has taken time several times to look into the legal position he was not able to cite an authority before me with regard to the presentation of time barred cheque by the payee for encashment nearly after four years. I am of the view that if time barred cheques can be encashed even after the expiry of the specified time it will create so many anomalous situations which are likely to be used by unscrupulous litigants. For all these reasons the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed.

(3.) At this stage Counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment may not come in the way of his client in enforcing the civil liability against the respondent. Having regard to the submission, it is clarified that the judgment in this case will be limited to the facts of this case only.