MAJJARI PULLANNA Vs. SUB COLLECTOR NAODYAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The State Government has assigned cultivable lands to one Nagamma on the basis that she was a landless poor person. That assignment was subject to a condition of inalienability. Nagamma, however, disregarding the condition of the grant, sold those lands in the year 1943 to one Taveri Naik who was also a landless poor person. Taveri Naik in his turn sold those lands to the writ petitioner under a sale deed dt: 3rd of January, 1953. Thus the land, which was originally assigned to Nagamma and was forbidden from being alienated, had changed more than once.

(2.) The authorities acting under the provisions of the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') called upon the petitioner under Section 3 of that Act to show cause why the lands he had purchased from Taveri Naik should not be resumed and restored back to Taveri Naik. The petitioner had submitted some explanation. But that he was a landless poor person was never a part of the petitioner's explanation. Rejecting the petitioners explanation, the Tahsildar, by his order dated 8th of September, 1978, directed resumption of the land and restoration of the same to the heirs of Taveri Naik. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the validity of that order of the Tahsildar.

(3.) The Act which was enacted with effect from 21st of January, 1977 had embodied the inalinability clause of the grants into its body. It had, therefore, declared all alienations of assigned lands by the assignee void and inoperative. In T. Onnuramma vs. Tahsildar, Kadiri #1 I held that this Act would apply even to those transactions of alienations that took place prior to its date of commencement. I relied upon the language of Section 3 which shows that assigned lands should not be transferred and should never be deemed to have been transferred and that no right of title in such land should be recognised as having ever vested in the person acquiring the land by such transfer. However, sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act provides that nothing in Section 3 should apply to assigned lands which were purchased by a landless poor person in good faith and for valuable consideration from the original assignee or his transferee prior to the commencement of the Act and which is in the possession of such person on the date of such commencement, for the purpose of cultivation or as a house site. The argument of the writ petitioner is that the prohibition contained in Section 3 of the Act would apply, if at all, only to the alienation made by Nagamma in favour of Taveri Naik and not to the alienation made by Taveri Naik in favour of the writ petitioner. The basis of his argument is that in the hands of Taveri Naik, the lands do not retain the characteristics of "assigned land". The words "assigned lands" were defined by Sec. 2 of the Act to mean lands assigned by the Government to the landless poor persons, under the rules for the time being in force, subject to the condition of non-alienation. Never the Government had assigned lands to Taveri Naik. Taveri Naik had purchased the land from Nagamma who was the assignee. It is, therefore, argued that in the hands of Taveri Naik the lands lose their character of being assigned lands and that by reason of sub-section (5) of Section 3, Taveri Naik acquires an absolute right to alienate those lands. The alienation of the lands by Taveri Naik which are not subject to any restriction of inalienability cannot be brought under the provisions of this Act. I have no doubt that there is any amount of force in this argument. A literal reading of the section and more particularly the definition of the words "assigned lands" in the operating provisions of Section 3 would show that the Act would apply only to those lands which were assigned by the Government subject to the condition of inalienability. That would show the condition in applying the Act is to that assignment made by the first transferee of these assigned lands. But clearly the implications of this interpretation, which were, I am sure, never present to the blind eye of a drafts man, would leave wide gaps open in the policy of the Act. Under this interpretation the object of Section 3 could easily be frustrated by resorting to one permissible alienation by the original grantee in favour of a landless poor person. I am, therefore, led to close those gaps which are, no doubt, wide enough to shut by a proper legislative amendment. Keeping the purpose of the Act in view I interpret sub-section (5) of Sec 3 to mean to restrain the transferee-poor person from alienating the land and for keeping the land for his cultivation or as a house site. Such a land can be divisible or heritable but cannot be alienable. It follows that Taveri Naik's alienation in favour of the writ petitioner should be treated as void. I apply the same reasoning to the interpretation of Section 4 of the Act. Following the above I dismiss this writ petition but without costs.