BHARAT HYBRID SEEDS Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition for quashing the entire proceedings in C.C.No. 17 of 1977 on the file of the Special Judical Second Class Magistrate, Kurnool, is filed under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioners, a firm and its Managing partner, Were charged with the offence under Section 7 read with Section 19 (a), Seeds Act, The offence is alleged to have been committed on 7th September, 1973. The complaint was lodged on 8th November, 1976 The punishment that can be imposed for the alleged offence even if it is proved and a conviction is based thereon, is only a fine and therefore, as prescribed by Section 468 (2) (a) the period of limitation for taking cognizance of such an offence is only six months. In this case, there is no doubt that the case has been filed long after the expiry of the period of six months which is the period of limitation. However, the Court took cognizance of the case. The present petitioners, when they appeared as accused filed Crl M P No. 66 of 1977 for th.owing out the complaint as time- barred and to acquit them. The Lower Court refused to comply with this application and so the accused have filed the present application for quashing the entire proceedings. Sri S. Venkata Reddy appearing for the petitioner, contends that, admittedly,'the cognizance of the offence for which a period of six months is fixed as limitation, was taken long after the expiry of that period. The complainant did not give satisfactory explanation for the long delay that elapsed between the commission of the offence and the filing of the complaint. What all was stated in the complaint is,

(2.) The learned Magistrate, while rejecting Crl. M.P.No. 66 of 1977 observed that while taking cognizance of the complaint, he had taken into consideration that investigation had to be made at Kurnool, Yellandu, Kothagudem and Bangalore which were situated in two States and that he was satisfied that delay in filing the complaint was unavoidable and properly explained Since the accused were not then present on the scene and he took cognizance, he did not pass any specific order in writing. He took cognizance of .he complaint under Section 190 (1) (a), Criminal Procedure Code He said that the actual reason for extending the period of limitation and taking cognizance of the complaint, though it was presented after the prescribed period of limitation, could be given at a later stage When the point was raised and after giving opportunity to both sides to be heard Ha concluded the other saying that delay in filing the complaint was properly explained and it was necessary to take cognizance of the offence in the interests of justice. He accordingly condoned the delay under Section 473, Criminal Procedure Coda. Saction 473, Criminal Procedure Code, enables the Court to extend time while taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of notice.

(3.) In the present case, there is ao doubt that the lower Coutt was on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay had been properly explained. Since investigation bad to take place in several places in the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, the delay occurred. I do not think I would be justified in interfering wish this judicial exercise of the discretion vested in the Lower Court. However, there must be a well laid practice in the matter of extending the period of limitation. The Criminal Procedure Code does not contain any procedure for condoning the delay in filing the complaint and extending time of the period of limitation. Section 46 and other provisions prescribe the period of limitation for takiug connizance. In fact, Section 468 imposes a bar on the Court, in taking cognizance of offences which are brought to its notice after the prescribed period of limitation However, Section 473 enables the Court to extend that period if it is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained. It must be noted that once the period of limitation prescribed under the Code or any other law for launching a prosecution has expired, certain rights would accrue to the accused to the effect that there would be no prosecution thereafter. It is true that the Court is clothed with power to extend time if it so thinks fit on the best of evidence adduced by the complainant. When the Court extends that time, it means it is interfering with the rights of the accused which have vested in him by the virtue of the expiry of the period of limitation. Therefore, even though there is no rule of law requiring the Court to issue notice to the proposed accused and to give him an opportunity for meeting the case of the complainant in regard to the extention of time, interests of justice and principles of natural justice require that the condonation of the delay and extention of time can be done only after giving a reasonable opportunity to the proposed accused. It would bs violating the very principles of natural justice and, in fact, the very spirit of the administration of justice, if a party is prosecuted in a Court of law after the period prescribed for the launching of the prosecution has been over and without giving him aa opportunity to explain his case as to why the delay should not be condoned. Absence of a rule of law shall not enable the Courts to extend time for filing prosecution without hearing the proposed accused". This rule of practice which is necessarily a rule of justice, must always be followed. I am supported in this view by a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in KRISHNA Vs. STATE OF A.P However, the decision of the Calcutta High Court in C.R. IRANI vs. STATE lays down that reasons for the extension of time can be given by the Court in a later stage when the accused enter their appearance and object to the prosecution having been barred by limitation. As I have said it is not only desirable but also essential in the interests of justice that even before cognizance of the offence is taken by the Court after the period of limitation, it should give notice and opportunity to the proposed accused and satisfy itself as to the adequacy of the reason for the delay.