(1.) IN this writ petition, the learned counsel 'or the petitioner relies upon the decision of Jeevan R eddy J.. in Writ Petition No. 831/76. Its correctness is questioned by the learned Government Pleader for Transport. I find some merit in the argument of the learned Govt. Pleader. I therefore direct that this Writ Petition may be posted before a Division Bench. (Judgment of the Bench delivered by Raghuvir, J.) ORDER
(2.) JWALA Peddai Reddy of Dharmavaram village held a highway route permit and was plying the vehicle A P. A 3494 on the route between villages Nayamaddala and Yellanur. He died on 7-1-1976. J. Narayanamma, his widow, continued to ply the vehicle and within thirty days she had informed the Regional Transport Officer. Anantapur of the death of Peddai Reddy. On 5-4-1976 Nirayanamma made an application and obtained the grant of "permit" on 13-4-1976 as "Successor" to the deceased permit-holder under section 61 of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act IV of 1939). The date of the order reveals the grant was made in her favour six days beyond the period of three months from the death of the deceased. The question at issue in th: writ petition arose when a notice was served on Narayanamma by the Deputy Transport Commissioner Kurnool (in R C. No. 892 B1/76) on 6-5-1976 and asked her to show cause why a tax of Rs. 460 and a penalty of Rs 920 should not be collected for plying the vehicle A P.A. 3494 for six days. Her explanation dated 25-2-1976 was considered and on 14 6-1976 She was asked finally to deposit the amount. Hence, the writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged the two requirements under section 61 of the 1939 Act for compliance by a successor are (a) to inform the authorities of the death of the permit-holder within thirty days and (b) to make the application for the grant of permit (to recognise as successor) within three months. Thereupon the authorities are to decide and may grant the permit. The grant if it is accorded beyond three months (by six days as in the instant case) the successor cannot be held culpable and penalised by levy of tax and penalty. The respondents have averred the sanction or grant on application by the "successor" under section 61 of the Act if ordered within three months relates back to the death of the deceased and it is contended if the sanction is made on a day (or days) after the expiration of three months it does not. On what parity of reasoning such a result follows is not elucidated. Passing an order, recognising a person ''successor" under section 61 of 1939 Act was considered in analogous circumstances by our learned Brother Jeevan Reddy, J. and held the "successor" cannot be penalised (in W.P. No. 831 of 1976 dated 21-7-1977) for the delay. The instant writ petition was referred to the 'Divisional Bench by Gangadhara Rao, J. having doubted the reasoning in that case in the reference order on 37-8-1977. The learned Government Pleader referred us to the following provisions in the 1939 Act. A permit is required under clause 1 of S. 42 of the Act to ply a passsenger or goods vehicle from the Regional Transport Authority. Section 59 (1) recites : "Save as provided in Sec. 61 a permit shall not be transferable except with the permission of the transport authority" Under section 61 it is argued the language employed is not similar to Cl (4) of section 58 where the Legislature in express language, recited "Such renewal shall effect from the date of such expiry irrespective of whether or not a temporary permit has been granted. Based on these provisions the learned counsel argued the absence of language in S. 61 similar to Cl (4) in section 58 makes the difference and for the six days, it is argued the writ petitioner is liable to pay the penalty demanded along With the tax, The permit accorded to the "successor" before or after expiration of three months should not make any difference for the delay thus occasioned is not due to the applicant-successor The "successor" cannot be held culpable for the time taken by the Transport Authorities in considering the application. There is an added reason why the successor is not liable. If the order under section 61 is not granted within three months under S. 61 he is not expected to stop plying the vehicle as that would be affecting the facilities to the travelling public. The route permits are granted under the act for the benefit of the travelling public. The Courts therefore will so interpret statutes (unless the Legislature expressly prohibits) and avoid such a painful sequence. The writ petitioner is declared as not obliged to pay the amount of tax and penalty demanded for the six days in question and in that view it is not necessary to decide the other question debated, whether the tax: demanded (in the impugned order) was properly ascertained by the respondent-authorities. The writ petition is, therefore allowed. No costs. G.V.K.R. W.P. Allowed.