(1.) This is a revision under section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 by the tenant of a residential building in Nizamabad. The respondent is the landlord. The eviction was sought by the landlord before the Rent Controller on two grounds. (1) Wilful default in payment of rent for about an year, (2) the landlord requires bonafide the building for his own occupation. The Rent Controller held that the tenant committed wilful default in the payment of rent and also found that the landlord requires the building for his own occupation, bonafide. On these two grounds eviction was ordered. It may be mentioned that the tenant did not pay the rent for about one year and his plea in that regard was that he was entitled to adjust the rent towards tuition fees for giving tuition to the son of the landlord's brother. The tenant filed the appeal in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nizamabad. The learned Subordinate Judge held that though there was default in payment of rent, default was not wilful. Apparertly, the learned Subordinate Judge was under the impression that the tenant believed that he could adjust the rent towards the tuition fees. Whatever that be, the tenant paid the entire rent due pending the proceedings and the amount was received by the landlord. So, that ground for eviction was negatived by the learned Subordinate Judge in the appeal. Next he considered the question whether the landlord required the house bonafide for his own occupation. On that point, he agreed with the Rent Controller and confirmed the order of eviction. Hence, this revision petition is filed in this Court on 20th August, 1966, and pending the revision petition, the eviction of the tenant is stayed. While so, the petitioner before me, i.e., the tenant filed C.M.P. No. 637 of 1967 to admit a registered deed of sale under which the landlord sold the house to a third party.
(2.) The sale deed is dated 13th day of December, 1966. It was executed by the landlord and his brother. It appeared that the landlord had only a share in the house and in that share the petitioner was residing as a tenant. This registered deed of sale is sought to be admitted for the purpose of proving that the case of the landlord that the bonafide required the house for his own occupation cannot be true. In the alternative it is argued that even though on the date of the filing of the eviction petition and on the date the Rent Controller passed the order of eviction and on the date when the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the appeal against the order of eviction, the landlord might have bonafide required the house for his own occupation, pending this G.R.P. the landlord's requirement to occupay the house has ceased and that therefore the order of eviction has to be vacated. But, Mr. Venkatayya, the learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to admit any additional evidence in revision under section 22 of the Act and in support of this argument reliance is placed on the wording of section 22 which reads as follows :
(3.) But it is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order of eviction has not become final, and that it is still sub judice for the reason that its finality is taken away by reason of the fact that the revision is filed and it is still pending and it is further contended that it is open to this Court to take note of subsequent events, events that happened subsequent to the passing of the orders of eviction and subsequent to the order confirming the order of eviction and if this Court is satisfied now, even at this stage, that the landlord's requirement to occupy the building no longer exists, than the order of eviction has to be set aside. In support of this, certain observations of Krishna Rao, J., in M/s. Kotalwar & Co. v. N.Durgaiah, 1966 2 An.W.R. 160. are relied upon. " If a tribunal has the powei to take note of subsequent event and if an amendment of the plead" ings is necessary to give effect to that power, it must necessarily have the inherent power to order amendment with a view to subserve the ends of justice and shorten the litigation............"