N SUBBAYYA Vs. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY VISAKHAPATNAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This batch of writ petitions challenges the notices issued by the Road Transport Authority for the grant of temporary permits under section 62 of the Motor Vehicels Act (IV of 1939). W.Ps. Nos. 1701 to 1705 of 1965, 1668, 1699, 1713, 1982 of 1965, 2304 of 1966, 131, 321, 344, 345, 386, 396, 410, 373, 389, 447, 452 and 496 of 1967 are petitions in which after applications for pucca permits were filed notices were issued calling for applications in respect of grant of temporary permits, W.Ps. No. 1153 of 1966,1634 of 1966, 410, 413 422, 369 and 416 of 1967 are those in which notifications calling for applications in respect temporary permits under section 62 (d) Madras Amendment were issued but no application for pucca permit was filed. In the other petitions notices were issued calling for applications for temporary permits. In some of them the provision of law under which temporary permits were to be given was not indicated, while in the others the notification issued under section 57 (2) was specified as the provision under which temporary permits would be granted. In all these petitions common questions of law arise. As such they have been heard together.

(2.) It is contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the Regional Transport Authority is not competent to grant temporary permits otherwise than under section 62 of the Central Motor Vehicles Act. The Madras amendment viz., clause (d) to section 62 is repugnant to and is in conflict with section 62 (d) of the Central Act ; as such it must yeild to the Central Act under Article 254 of the Constitution. It is next contended that when once there is an application for the grant of a pucca permit pending, under the first proviso to .section 62 (d) the Transport Authority has no jurisdiction to grant temporary permits. Sri Mangachari while adopting the arguments of the learned Advocates for the petitioners in respect of the aforsaid contentions, nonetheless submitted that clause (5) to section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act is invalid as it confers excessive delegation without laying down any guidance for the exercise of powers and for the same reason rule 169 is also invalid.

(3.) In our view if the first contention is substantiated and is held, valid, the second question does not arise but if that contention on the other hand is not held valid, then the second question has to be answered in the affirmative because if the Madras Amendment to section 62 (d) can stand side by side with the Central Amendment, even then the proviso will hold the field and the Regional Transport Authority is precluded from granting temporary permits as long as the pucca permits are pending.