P BHOOMAIAH Vs. NAWAB KUTUBUDDIN KHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These cases came up for orders before us under the following circumstances : S.R. No. 18075 of 1966 is an unnumbered petition under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, praying to receive and transmit the accompanying C.M.A. to the Court of the First Additional Chief judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. By order dated 22nd April, 1966, the Munsif-Magistrate, West Hyderabad, ordered the return of the plaint in O.S. No. 2 of 1966 on his file for presentation to the proper Court on the ground that the correct value of the suit is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif-Magistrate's Court. The suit was one for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the suit land bearing S. No. 182 of the extent of 2 acres, situated at Alwal village. An appeal against that order under Order 43, rule 1 Civil Procedure Code, lies to the Court of the First Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. But by the time the appeal was sought to be preferred by the plaintiff, the Court of the First Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad stood adjourned for summer. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the S.R. No. 1875 of 1966 in the High Court before the Vacation Judge along with G.M.A. (S.R. No. 17472) praying to receive the said G.M.A. and to transmit the same to the Court of the First Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad to which Court the appeal lay under the Hyderabad Civil Courts Act, There was also a petition (C.M.P. No. 4431 of 1966) under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 Civil Procedure Code praying to pass an order of temporary injunction against the respondents restraining them from interfering With the possession of the petitioner of the suit land. The office of the High Court took objection to the maintainability of the proceedings in the High Court when the appeal lay only to the Court of the First Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The stand taken by the office was that, though section 13 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Civil Courts Act, 1873 provides that when the District Court or the Subordinate Judge's Court to which an appeal lies is adjourned under section 30 of the said Act, the High Court shall have power to receive such appeals, there is no such corresponding provision in the Hyderabad Civil Courts Act which governs the present case. Therefore, the office of the High Court felt a doubt whether the High Court has power to receive the said C.M.A. (S.R. No. 17472) and to pass interim orders and to transmit the same to the Court of the First Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. A note to that effect was put up by the office and the matter was posted before Venkatesam, J., on 10th May, 1966. The learned Judge passed the following order on S.R. No. 18075. "Post after vacation. Interim injunction and notice."

(2.) After the High Court reopened, the matter came up for final orders before Narasimham, J., who passed the following order on this S.R. and the connected cases.

(3.) It may be noted that, though the appeal was received and interim stay was ordered, the appeal was nat transmitted to the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court. The appellate authorities in the case of the two appeals under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act are nat Courts but are persc.no, designata. The Hyderabad Civil Courts Act does not apply to them since they are nut Courts. The two appeals were sought to be presented to the High Court during the summer vacation, because it was alleged that the two appellate authorities viz., the Chief Judge, Small Causes Courts, Hyderabad in the one case and the Subordinate Judge, Warangal in the other were adjourned for the summer vacation and there was no appellate authority working to receive the appeals and pass interim orders. It is not quite clear under what provision of law the two appellate authorities stopped working for the summer vacation. But it is common ground that they were not working and were not receiving the .appeals at the time when they were presented to the High Court. Therefore, all the three cases were heard on the footing that the appellate Court in the one case ar.d the appellate authorities in the other two cases were not working at the time.