(1.) This second appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the respondent- plaintff against the 1st defendant, who is the appellant before me as well as against the 2nd defendant. The facts necessary for the purpose of understanding the arguments advanced before me are that the 2nd defendant married the 1st defendant's daughter. The 1st defendant's daughter filed O.S. No. 121 of 1954 in the Sub Court, Visakhapatnam against the 2nd defendant for maintenance. The claim however was compromised. The 1st defendant's daughter was given one-fourth share in the property of the 2nd defendant for life. The 2nd defendant however file d O.S. No. 31 of 1957 before the District Munsif, Yelliamanchili for cancellation of the abovcsaid compromise on the ground that the 1st defendant's daughter was unchaste ar.d was not entitled to get any maintenance. Pending that suit, the parties again entered into a compromise. In pursuance of that compromise, defendants 1 and 2 both executed separate promissory notes for Rs. 1,500 in favour of the respondent plaintiff. The plaintiff transferred these promissory notes for consideration in favour of the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant instituted a suit for the recovery of the amount due on the promissory note (Exhibit A-1) against the respondent-plaintiff as well as against the 1st defendant who was the executant of the promissory note. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant contested separately the suit on similar grounds. Their main contention was that both the promissory note as well as the endorsement are not supported by consideration. On enquiry however it was found that the promissory note as well as the endorsement were supported by consideration and consequently decree was passed in favour of the 2nd defendant against the respondent-plaintiff as well as 1st defendant-appellant. The decree-holder, 2nd defendant, executed the decree and realised the entire amount from the respondent-plaintiff.
(2.) The respondent has now filed the suit for recovery of the amount which he has paid under the decree from the 1st defendant who was originally the executant of the promissory note and was also a party to the decree. In this suit, the defence of the 1st defendant was that the promissory note was not supported by consideration but the endorsement was supported by consideration and since the plaintiff paid only the amount which he had received he cannot ask for any amount from the 1st defendant. The trial Court after recording the evidence decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that under section 69 of the Contract Act, the 1st defendant is liable t reimburse the amount to the plaintiff. The 1st defendant therefore carried the matter in appeal. The appellate Court agreeing with the trial Court's conclusion, held that the 1st defendant is liable to reimburse the entire amount. It is this concurrent finding of the Courts below that is now assailed in this second appeal. It is not disputed that the trial Court has on the appreciation of the material before it expressly found that the promissory note as well as the endorsement on Exhibit A-1 were supported by consideration. In the lower appellate Court, this question does not seem to have been agitated. Arguments were advanced merely on legal grounds contending that in any case the 1st defendant is not liable to reimburse the amount.
(3.) The learned Advocate appearing for the appellant argues that section 69 of the Contract Act is not applicable to the tacts of this case and in support of his contention he relies on Shankerlal v. Motilal, A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 267. Section 69 of the Contract Act is as follows:- "A person who is interested, in the payment of money which another is bound by law to pay and who therefore pays it, it entitled to be reimbursed by the other." In order to attract the provisions of section 69, it must be proved that the person making the payment was interested in making that payment and secondly that another person was bound in law to make that payment. It is only when these two things are satisfied that the person making the payment can ask lor reimbursement under section 69 of the Contract Act. What has therefore to be seen in this case is whether in law the 1st defendant was bound to pay the amount oi the promissory note executed by him and the plaintiff who was the endorser was interested in making the payment. In so far as the first question is concerned, section 37 of the Negotiable