RAJAMMA Vs. C. V. KOTIAH CHETTY AND CO.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE judgment -debtor is the appellant. On Khurdad 1, 1358 F. (April 1, 1949), an execution petition was filed against him by the Respondent claiming recovery of the decretal amount and costs. The date of the decree passed by the trial Court is Mehir 25, 1345 F. (August 31, 1946), and that of the High Court is Azur 24, 1355 F. (October 28, 1945). As the. execution petition is beyond three years of both the dates, the decree -holder had pleaded a later order by the High Court, which he claimed, to give him a fresh starting point.

(2.) THE learned Advocate of the appellant has argued that neither the order of Farwardi 25. 1356 F. (February 25, 1947), nor the earlier order of Isfandar 8, 1356 F. (January 8, 1947), furnishes starting point for limitation under Art. 160 of the Hyderabad Limitation Act, which was similar to Art. 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, There is unanimity of opinion that in order to furnish a starting point for counting three years under Cl. (3) of the third column of Art. 182, the order must allow the review petition. The latest of such authorities is the Division Bench Case of Laxman Govigda v. Dagdu Sripati, : AIR 1954 Bom 457 (A). The same view has been taken in Mohammad Naqir v. Allauddin Ahmad : AIR 1941 Pat. 213 (B). These cases follow Kapuram Zamindar v. Sadasiva, ILR 10 Mad 66 (C).

(3.) WE do not take the aforesaid observation as overruling the authorities that in order to furnish a starting date for the period of limitation the review application must be granted. Indeed the only decision which could have been cited in support of the respondents' claim is of a Single Judge of the Bombay High court which has been dissented from in, AIR 19S Bombay 457 (A).