KAPAVARAPU SUBBAMMA Vs. YALLA PAPAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question raised in this revision turns upon the construction of the provisions of section 12 of the Hereditary Village Offices Act (Madras Act III of 1895). The competing claimants to the village office of potter service are the sister and uncle's son of the last office-holder. Under the existing law, the sister is a nearer their than the uncle's son, but under the law as existed at the time when the Madras Act, III of 1895, was enacted, the paternal uncle's son had the preferential claim to that of the sister. Section 12 of the Act reads:

(2.) The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the words "applicable thereto at the date on which this Act comes into force" govern the word 'custom' but not the word 'law' and, therefore, the law obtaining at the time the succession opens would govern the situation. Prima facie, the aforesaid words govern both the law and the custom. There is no valid reason why for custom the date on which the Act came into force is crucial and for law the date when succession opens is important. The learned counsel suggests that 'law' is easily ascertainable whereas 'custom' is difficult of ascertainment and, therefore, the Legislature fixed the date of the coming into force of the Act for ascertaining the custom, leaving the changing law to govern claims to succession as and when they arise. But, we do not see how it it easier to ascertain the custom existing on the date on which the Act came into force than that obtaining at the time the succession opens. Both law and custom govern the rights off parties; both are susceptible of change and both with have to be ascertained whatever the date is fixed. In the circumstances, it is not possible for us to hold from the alleged inherent difficulties in proving custom that it was the intention of the Legislature to make a distinction between the two in the matter of their application to succession. It appears to us that the circumstances operating in the minds of the Legislators, if they could be guessed or inferred, would support the interpretation giving the same operative force to both law and custom rather than fixing one date for law and another for custom. The natural meaning of the words used will not only bring out the intention of the Legislature but also would not lead to any anomalies or contradictions. Umamaheswaram, J., in Challapalli Venkataratnam v. Chinna Veeranna, W.P.No. 655 of 1952 , after adverting to the provisions of the aforesaid section, observed as follows:

(3.) Though the learned Judge has not given any reasons for his view, probably because the meaning is so self-evident that no reasons are necessary to support it - we agree with his conclusion.