(1.) Petitioner was selected and appointed as Casual Driver in 1989 on contract basis. His services were regularized with effect from 01.10.1992. His date of birth was entered in the Service Register as 01.07.1959. As per the date of birth as recorded in the Service Register, he is entitled to continue in service up to 30.06.2017. While so, petitioner was served notice informing that at the time of joining service, a wrong date of birth was recorded in his Service Register, whereas his date of birth ought to have been shown as 01.02.1959 and in such an event, petitioner is liable to retire from service with effect from 31.01.2017. It appears, even though notice dated 18.08.2016 was acknowledged by him, petitioner did not respond to it. Further orders are passed on 15.12.2016 altering the date of birth of petitioner to 01.02.1959 and thereby, petitioner is informed that he would retire from service on attaining the age of superannuation, as per the corrected date of birth, on 31.01.2017. Challenging the same, this Writ Petition is filed.
(2.) Though initially, it was contended by learned counsel for petitioner that alteration of date of birth in the Service Register was not preceded by notice and opportunity, the material filed along with the counter-affidavit would disclose that notice was served and petitioner did not respond to it and after having given sufficient time, decision was taken for altering the date of birth of petitioner. Learned counsel has not seriously pressed this contention.
(3.) Learned counsel would submit that once date of birth of petitioner was already recorded in the Service Register at the time of joining service, the same could not have been altered after long lapse of time that too just before his retirement and that action of respondent authorities is ex facie illegal. He would submit that principle of law is well settled that no date of birth can be altered at the fag end of service and all such claims made by employees should be rejected. When this is the principle of law, the question of employer undertaking exercise of altering the date of birth of employee at the fag end of service also does not arise, and they should also be subjected to the same principle. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble and others (2010) 14 Supreme Court Cases 423.