TEKULAPALLY VEERA REDDY Vs. TEKULAPALLY NARAYANA REDDY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two Second Appeals are filed by the unsuccessful defendant tukulapally Veera Reddy aggrieved by the decree and judgment made in A. S. No. 17 of 1994 on the file of the court of Senior civil Judge, Siddipet, Medak District, and also the decree and judgment made in A. S. No. 1 of 1995 on the file of the Court of said senior Civil Judge, Siddipet, Medak District, respectively. The appellant died and the legal representatives were brought on record in both these appeals. Narayana Reddy, second plaintiff in the suit O. S. No. 20 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, gajwel, is the respondent. It is stated that first plaintiff Sathamma is no more. Both the plaintiffs - Sathamma and Narayana reddy instituted the suit - O. S. No. 20 of 1986 on the file of the Court of the District munsif, Gajwel, praying for the reliefs of cancellation of a registered sale deed dated 1-9-1993 under Section 31 of the Specific relief Act, 1963 (the Act, for brevity) and also for consequential relief of recovery of possession of the suit lands in the event defendant being found in possession thereof and also prayed for the relief of perpetual injunction. The suit was resisted by filing a written statement in detail and the Court of first instance. after settling the issues recorded the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3. D. Ws. 1 to 6, marked Exs. A-1 to A-11 and Exs. B-1 b-12. 'a'and ultimately came to the conelusion that the registered sale deed No. 1806 dated 1-9-1983 be cancelled, which shall be communicated to the Sub-Registrar, gajwel, for noting the cancellation on the said registered document, but however, recorded a finding that second plaintiff is not entitled to any relief since he failed to prove that he is legal heir of first plaintiff and the parties were directed to bear their own costs. Aggrieved by the same, second plaintiff carried the matter by way of appeal - A. S. No. 17 of 1994 on the file of the Court of the senior Civil Judge, Siddipet, Gajwel, and the defendant aggrieved by the decree relating to the cancellation also preferred A. S. No. 1 of 1995 on the file of the Court of said Senior civil Judge, Siddipet, Medak District. The lower appellate Court by a common judgment, after recording reasons, allowed the appeal - A. S. No. 17 of 1994 and dismissed the appeal - A. S. No. 1 of 1995 and the parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout. Aggrieved by the said judgments and decrees, the present two second Appeals had been preferred. As referred to supra, the original defendant/appellant died. The legal representatives were brought on record and at present the said legal representatives are further prosecuting the Second Appeals.

(2.) SRI. V. V, Narasimha Rao, the learned counsel representing the appellants had taken this Court through, the findings recorded by the Court of first instance and also the findings recorded by the lower appellate court and would point out that ground Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 24, 25, 27 and 30 are the substantial questions of law to be considered in these Second appeals. The learned counsel also, while elaborating his submissions, would maintain that the adoption in question is not proved tn accordance with law and when clear findings had been recorded by the court of first Instance, the lower appellate court, without properly adverting to the respective contentions of the parties and without recording appropriate findings, had reversed such findings recorded by the Court of first instance and hence such findings are unsustainable. The learned counsel also pointed out relating to the entries in the revenue records, which are left undisturbed at this stage and the appellants continuing in possession of the properties in question. The learned counsel also would maintain that in the absence of any acceptable evidence relating to the plea of adoption and also in the absence of any other evidence to the effect that respondent/second plaintiff succeeded to the interest of first plaintiff after the death of first plaintiff, he (respondent/ second plaintiff) has no locus stand) at all at present to question the validity of the sale deed in question and the relief of cancelation definitely cannot be granted in favour of such person who has no locus standi to question said transaction. While further elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel also pointed out to the relevant portions of the findings recorded by the Court of first instance and also the relevant findings recorded by the lower appellate Court". Further the learned counsel would contend that it is not as though the said Ram Reddy, husband of first plaintiff, died even by the date of the sale deed in controversy but the death is subsequent thereto and though acceptable evidence had been placed before the Court, this aspect had not been considered in proper perspective. At any rate, the learned counsel would submit that when valid adoption is not proved in accordance with law irrespective of the other questions involved, the respondent in these Second appeals i. e. second plaintiff be non-suited and the suit be dismissed and the Second appeals are liable to be allowed. The learned counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his contentions.

(3.) PER contra, Sri Rajamalla Reddy, the learned counsel representing the respondent in both these appeals, would maintain that in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances, there is no substantial question of law involved at all for the reason that the property in question belonged to first plaintiff only and the episode relating to adoption is very clear even if the adoption ceremony during the childhood to be disbelieved for any reason that first plaintiff herself executed Ex. A-3 the registered adoption deed and by virtue of the same, the presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, ! 956 (the Maintenance act, for brevity) would be available. The learned counsel also would maintain that Section 8 of the Maintenance Act deals with the capacity of a female Hindu to take in adoption and since Ex. A-3 was executed by first plaintiff after the death of her husband only, that too in relation to her own property, the adoption as such cannot be doubted in any manner whatsoever. Since the concept of adoption is more concerned with the diversion of natural course of succession, first plaintiff as a person interested in her own properties might have thought of executing Ex. A-3 and thus the original adoption made by both husband and wife had been in a way confirmed and further strengthened Ex. A-3. The learned counsel also pointed out to the relevant portions of the findings recorded by the lower appellate court and would maintain that in the facts and circumstances, the lower appellate court arrived at the correct conclusion. While further elaborating the submissions, the learned counsel also pointed out to the scope and ambit of Section 31 of the Act and further placed strong reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions.