MHEK FEED INDUSTRIES Vs. AMRUTLAL KATARIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Court on 27-6-2006 in C.M.A.M.P. No. 646 of 2006 made the following order. "Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. In the circumstances, there shall be interim direction to the respondents or their agents or their representatives, not to interfere with the petitioner's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the premises in question, provided the lease Is subsisting." C.M.A.M.P. No. 1964 of 2006 was filed to vacate the interim direction. The said application was filed by the third respondent- State Bank of India (hereinafter in short referred to as 'the Bank' for the purpose of convenience). This Court on 8-2-2006 made the said order absolute and directed the Registry to list the matter for final hearing.

(2.) Sri Pratap Narayan Sanghi, learned counsel representing the appellant, the petitioner in I.A. No. 817 of 2005 in O.S. No. 9 of 2005 on the file of the District Judge, Nizamabad, would maintain that in the light of the registered lease deed dated 19-2-2005, the appellant can be evicted only by due process of law. The learned counsel also would submit that even if the registered lease deed to be taken as not a valid document, the same cannot be over looked unless it is declared so by the competent Court. The learned counsel also would contend, that inasmuch as the factum of possession is not in dispute, the appellant being a tenant/ non-party to the borrowing transaction, his interest to be protected. The counsel also would submit that the ground of attack that the lease transaction is a collusive one and brought into existence to defeat the rights of the bank, cannot hold water and even otherwise this is a question to be decided at the time of final disposal of the suit. While further elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel would maintain that no notice was issued to the appellant-petitioner and the suit was filed on 28-3-2005. The learned counsel also had given the dates of publications made in Eenadu and Hindu on 10-9-2006 and 12-9-2006. The learned counsel also had taken this Court through Section 2(f), Section 13 sub-sections (2) and (4), Section 31(e), Sections 34, 35 and 37 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter in short referred to as 'the Act' for the purpose of convenience) and would maintain that even in the light of the definition of the "borrower" and also the scheme of different provisions of the Act the third party interest cannot be jeopardized. The learned counsel also would maintain that a third party like one in the present case, a lenant. cannot get himself impleaded even before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and cannot pray for appropriate reliefs. Hence, the suit is perfectly maintainable in a competent civil Court. The counsel also would submit that it cannot be taken as though that in all cases there would be collusive transactions only, there may be bona fide transactions as well and such bona fide transactions relating to the non-parties may have to be protected, and hence, the appellant is having a strong prima facie case and balance of convenience also in his favour and in the event of the relief of temporary injunction be negatived at this stage, the appellant would be put to irreparable loss. The learned counsel also would contend that the bank is interested in recovery of the amount, and as a tenant, the appellant is prepared to deposit the rents even with the bank if such directions are to be issued in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, by this Court. The counsel also relied on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions.

(3.) Sri Razak, learned counsel representing R-1 and R-2 would maintain that these are real owners of the property and they had created security over these properties and had obtained the loan and they are willing to repay the amount. The learned counsel also would contend that in fact serious attempts are being made in the direction of getting one time settlement in this regard. The counsel also would maintain that the landlord and tenant relationship between the appellant and the respondents 1 and 2 is not in serious controversy.