(1.) This appeal is directed against the confirming judgment of the learned single Judge decreeing the suit brought by the respondent for specific performance of contract of thesuithouse. The agreement was executed by appellnt No.1, with the respondent but in the suit filed by the respondent against appeallant No.1 for specific performance, the appellants 2 and 3, sons of appellant No.1 got themselves impleaded as defendants 2 and 3 setting up the defence that appellant No.1 had no authority to execute the agreement of sale since they were the actual owners of the property, and that the property had been purchased by appellant No.1 in his own name though money had been advanced by the two sons for the purchase. It was also their case that the agreement was a fraudulent one as it was intended to be an agreement of lease for the house to be taken on rent by the respondent, but taking advantage of the old age of appellant No.1 fraud was practised upon him by the respondent to get an agreement of sale executed instead and that it was so possible as the appellants 2 and 3 were away at Guntur for collection of their dues on a tobacco deal. Both the trial Court and the learned single Judge reached the concurrent findings of the agreement of sale as to be genuine and the appellant No.l to have had the title to the property and competence to execute the agreement. The fact of any fraud having been played was disbelieved and on the finding that the respondent was throughout ready and willing to purchase the property, the suit was decreed.
(2.) Mr. Mirza Munawwar Ali Baig, learned counsel for the appellants urges the finding regarding the respondent to have been ready and willing to purchase the property as one which could not have been reached since after the decree of the suit, which directed him to deposit the balance of the sale consideration within one month, the respondent did not deposit the money and instead pleaded illness which disabled him to make the deposit. No medical certificate was filed in support of his illness. He later on deposited the money but during the pendency of the appeal in this Court he made an application to the Court for withdrawal of the money which was allowed. It is for such reason, the learned Counsel submits it must be held mat he was never ready and willing, and that the decree for specific performance was against equity and the principles of natural justice for which it is, violative of S.L.O. of the Specific Performances of the Contract Act.
(3.) The submission is totally misconceived. The fact of ready and willingness to perform the part of the agrement is a matter to be decided in the suit itself on the pleadings and evidence led. Once a decree is passed it is final and binding subject to the result of appeals, if any, in higher forums. If any circumstances are pleaded after the decree is passed to defer the time for depositing the money or if for any circumstances shown the appellate Court passed orders on interlocutory application for withdrawal of the money, those considerations are not to be regarded as in any way invalidating the decree. That being so we are not impressed with the submissions made by the learned Counsel.