S SHAKUNTALA Vs. ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER MCH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners seek a Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in issuing the notice No.PA/162/C5/Tax95, dated 28-9-1995 and the Demand Notice dated 10-2-1996 requiring them to pay the municipal tax without reference to the actual rent received by them as illegal and arbitrary.

(2.) To appreciate the scope of the complaint of the petitioners, it would be necessary to state relevant facts here. The petitioners, it is stated, are the life estate holders of premises bearing Nos.1-7-198 to 200 situate at M.G.Road, Secunderabad and they have the right to enjoy the rents derived from the said premises. They say that the property was leased out to a tenant on a rent of Rs.800/- per month in 1952 and the same tenant is in continuous possession of the said premises. The municipal tax payable on that basis was Rs. 3,325-25 yearly. The present proceedings arises out of the special notice issued by the first respondent, viz., Additional Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderababd under Section 220 (2) of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act'). The notice, it is stated, was issued in the name of a dead person one Sri T. Anjaiah. However, the petitioners who are interested in the said property filed objections before the 1st respondent. They have not heard anything in respect of the objections filed by them and to their surprise, they received demand notice dated 10-2-1996 purported to have been issued under Section 268 of the Act calling upon them to pay a sum of Rs. 1,17,368-25 Ps. as property tax upto the year ending on 31-3-1996 within 15 days from the date of service of that notice. This demand, inter alia, contains a recital that in default of payment of tax, warrant of distress will be issued for recovery of the said amount. The validity of this notice is assailed in this Writ Petition.

(3.) Sri V. Eswaraiah, the learned counsel for the petitioners, invited our attention to the provisions of Sections 220 to 223 of the Act and has submitted that neither a date for investigation of the complaint was fixed nor any notice for hearing of the objections was given, therefore, the impugned order of demand is in violation of not only the principles of natural justice but also the provisions of Sections 220 to 223 of the Act, as such it is liable to be quashed.