LAWS(APH)-1996-2-63

KAMALAMMA Vs. MANAGEMENT OF NURSING INDUSTRIES

Decided On February 02, 1996
KAMALAMMA Appellant
V/S
MANAGEMENT OF NURSING INDUSTRIES, HYDERABAD REP. BY ITS PARTNER RAMRATAN JHAWAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard the learned Counsel for the appellants (workmen) and the learned Counsel for the respondents (management).

(2.) It is not in dispute that the (respondents) appellants were employed in the coke manufacturing industry of the respondent-management. They were subjected to a domestic enquiry and removed from service on the alleged proof of various allegations levelled against them. The Labour Court ordered reinstatement without back-wages. The management moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The court at the time of admission of the writ petition granted stay on condition of complying with the requirements of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appeal against the said order under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was dismissed. There is some proceeding taken in the Court of the District Munsif, Hyderabad West and South, Ranga Reddy in O.S.No. 180 of 1986 in which an order of interim injunction is granted on 9-9-1988 in the following terms:

(3.) Nothing has been shown to us to take the view, however, mat there is any mistake in the award. Modification, as ordered by the learned single Judge, however, has been ordered, it appears, in exercise of the power of the Labour Court by the learned single Judge as provided under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Ordinary rule, however, of the judicial review of an order is that the Court invariably should exercise refrain of not entering into the exercise of judicial discretion in deciding whether any compensation should be awarded in lieu of reinstatement by the Labour Court. The rule as is ordinarily applied in cases of imposition of punishment in exercise of a statutory power by a statutory authority is that the Court doesn't prefer to enter into the sufficiency or otherwise of the punishment and whether the punishment imposed is reasonable or not, unless the punishment awarded is shockingly inappropriate and so arbitrary that no reasonable person can support the same. The same view, however, is relaxed in the case of an award under Sec. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned single Judge, therefore, in our opinion, was acting within the jurisdiction in entering into the desirability of the order of reinstatement. The case has, however, caused us to think that interference with the order of reinstatement is not justifiable for the reasons as stated in the order of the learned single Judge. He has considered matters not pertaining to the case which was taken before the Labour Court in a casual manner. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we have noticed the reluctance of the employer for the reasons apparent on the face of the record that they have no trust any more upon the appellants for what they have done after the order of reinstatement. This almost made the management helpless in continuing its work. The same, in our opinion, however, will not justify denial of compensation in such terms which will adequately compensate the appellants for the loss of service which will be occasioned in case reinstatement is denied to them. Keeping the above in view, we are of the opinion that the appellants have to be adequately compensated and reinstatement be denied to them,