DULCIE M ROBB Vs. MURID HYDER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This contempt case concerns the alleged non-compliance of the decree granted by a Division Bench of this Court (to which one of us, M. N. Rao, J., was a party) on a compromise memo in L.P.A. No. 265 of 1990 dated 30/04/1992. The petitioner herein is the sister of one Stanley Anthony Corbett, who was the exclusive owner of House No. 246 (old) corresponding to 10-2-375 (new) at Road No. 8, West Marred pally, Secunderabad. The house is situate in the cantonment area where land was leased out for 99 years by the Cantonment Board. Stanley Anthony Corbett died a bachelor. By a Will dated 9-1-1956, he bequeathed the house in question to the petitioner herein. Her suit - O.S. No. 241 of 1980 - for grant of Letters of Administration was decreed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The first defendant in the suit is another sister of the deceased Stanley Anthony Corbett. Against the suit, C.C.C.A. No. 15 of 1984 was preferred by the first defendant to this Court and the same was dismissed by a learned single Judge on 19-10-1990. Thereafter, L.P.A. No. 265 of 1990 was preferred and during its pendency, the first defendant (appellant in the LPA) died and her son, the second respondent herein, was brought on record as her legal representative. A memo of compromise was filed in the L.P.A., before this Court and in terms of the said compromise, a decree was passed by this Court on 30/04/1992. The other respondents in the L.P.A., were given up. The compromise decree, inter alia, says that the petitioners herein should pay a sum of Rs. 4,00,000.00 to the second respondent as and when the property is sold by her. She should, one month before the payment of the money, inform the same to the second respondent herein, who shall vacate the portion of the house in his occupation and deliver peaceful possession to the petitioner and the amount of Rupees 4,00,000/- should be paid to him by the petitioner on the date of the delivery of possession. The second respondent also was entitled to remove the abestos sheets etc., which he had erected for the purpose of running a school in the portion of the house in his possession. Under the compromise, he delivered the original of the lease deed executed by the Cantonment Board to the petitioner herein. Clause (5) of the compromise decree says that the second respondent herein, in consideration of the above compromise, "withdraws his claims" in respect of the House Bearing No. 246, Road No. 8, West Marred pally, Secunderabad and by Clause (6), admitted the Will dated 9-1-1956 relied upon by the petitioner herein by which late Stanley Anthony Corbett bequeathed the property to the petitioner. The second respondent undertook that he "shall not question the title of the property or the Will in favour of respondent No. 1 (the petitioner herein) in any other proceedings." Because of this compromise memo, the petitioner herein agreed to withdraw the petition filed by her seeking eviction of the second respondent from the portion of the house in his occupation. Accordingly, the eviction petition was withdrawn by the petitioner herein.

(2.) It is the case of the petitioner that in consideration of the terms of the compromise and the solemn undertaking given by the second respondent she withdrew the eviction petition and all her attempts to secure possession of the house were scuttled by the second respondent. When she entered into an agreement to sell the house, she got that fact intimated through a lawyer's notice to the second respondent herein enclosing the photo-state copy of the banker's cheque for Rs. 4,00,000.00 drawn in his favour but he not only did not send any reply to the notice but filed a suit - O.S. No. 408 of 1993 - seeking permanent injunction restraining the petitioner herein from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the eastern portion of the suit premises. A second suit O.S. No. 359 of 1995 - was got filed by the second respondent in collusion with one C. S. Sastry alleging that the petitioner herein had entered into an agreement with Sri C. S. Sastry, a builder, for construction of a multi storeyed building but subsequently resiled from the agreement. A third suit - O.S. No. 1203 of 1995 - was filed by the second respondent in the Court of the Ist Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad seeking a perpetual injunction. The applications for ad interim injunction in both the suits were dismissed by reasoned orders by the respective Civil Courts. The petitioner alleged that the second respondent had sent unsocial elements to terrorise her and he also actually assaulted her and in that connection, a police complaint was lodged on 2-7-1995. She also alleged that when she was away, the second respondent broke open the lock and entered into the house and occupied two rooms and in that connection, a police complaint was lodged and prosecution also was launched in C.C. No. 711 of 1995 which is pending on the file of the X Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad. When she filed E.P. No. 20 of 1995 for execution of the compromise decree, an application - E.A. No. 5 of 1995 - was filed by the second respondent, for the first time taking the plea that the compromise decree was the result of fraud and undue influence. That application was dismissed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court on 18-3-1996 and the petitioner herein was directed to deposit a sum of Rupees 4,00,000/-, which she did on 21-3-1996. An order was passed on 29-3-1996 by the Chief Judge directing the second respondent herein to deliver possession within one month. Challenging the same, C.R.P. No. 1006 of 1996 was filed in this Court by the second respondent and the same was dismissed by a learned single Judge by a reasoned order on 26-4-1996.

(3.) The case of the second respondent is that the compromise decree itself was obtained by fraud and that he was entitled to challenge the validity of the compromise decree by resorting to appropriate legal remedies. The land on which the house in question stands being a leasehold land, the petitioner is not entitled to sell the same and, therefore, it must be deemed that the compromise was vitiated. In any event, there can be no charge of contempt against a person for flouting a compromise decree. He has not denied the filing of the suits and the orders passed therein.