(1.) THESE two C.R.Ps. are preferred against the orders passed in I.A. Nos. 10 and 17 of 1996 in R.A. No 372/1994 on the file of the Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court. I.A. No. 10/1996 was filed against the order enlarging the time by three days for paying the arrears of rent by the tenant. I.A. No. 17/1996 was filed to set aside the ex part order passed in I.A. No. 10/1996. The Rent Control appellate authority granted 15 days' time for the deposit of arrears of rent, by his order in I.A. No. 1930/94 dated 27.12.1994.
(2.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out two infirmities in the order. Firstly, the application for extension of time was not served on the petitioner's counsel. Secondly, the affidavit filed by the Advocate in support of I.A. does not disclose sufficient reasons and on the basis of such affidavit, the learned appellate Judge should not have extended the time, that too, without assigning any reasons. I agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Additional Chief Judge ought not to have passed orders extending the time without service of copy of application on the other side counsel and without hearing the counsel. Further, it is surprising that the Court has acted on an affidavit filed by the Advocate when the averments and the facts stated in the affidavit are not within the special knowledge of the Advocate. Much can be said against the manner in which the application has been dealt with by the appellate Judge. In I.A. No. 17/1996, the learned Judge observed that at the time went the oral request was made by the counsel for the tenant that the petition was being filed for extension of time, the landlord's counsel did not object for the entertainment of such application. But that is not a proper approach to the problem. The counsel for the other side need not be found fault with for not objecting in advance to the filing of the proposed petition for extension of time. All these defects notwithstanding, I am of the view that in the circumstances of the case, no interference under Section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is called for. The extension of time sought for is only three days. The vacation intervened a few days after the order was passed in I.A. No. 1930/1994 granting 15 days time to the tenant to pay the arrears of rent. The extension of time being a discretionary matter and the delay is minimal, it would be a mere formality to send back the matter to the lower Court for fresh disposal on the ground of non-service of notice on the petitioner's counsel when there is a reasonable certainty of the same order being passed even after remand. The power of revision even under Section 22 of the Act ought not to be exercised merely to set right trifling irregularities in procedure or for the sake of a mere formality. I, therefore, see no ground to entertain these revision petitions. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in L. Madan Lal v. Jai Prakash, (1986) 1 Andh. LT 555. I do not think that it has any bearing on the question whether the short extension of time should be legitimately granted.