(1.) A son, dependant upon his father and the step-mother who were the bread- winners of the family, lost the iatter and sought accordingly compassionate appointment. The appellants, however, did not accept his claim on the ground that since his father was still working, he was not a dependant of the step mother and under the scheme of such compassionate appointment, if the bread winner father was still alive, his dependant son, even though the step-mothar had died, could not claim compassionate appointment. Learned single Judge has, however, taken notice of the fact that the father of the writ petitioner and the step-mother were together earning for the family. He has also accepted that for the purposes of the earning of the family there could be no division between the dependents upon the income of the father and dependants upon the income of the mother, a step-mother included. One can legitimately, however, subscribe to the above upon which the appellants have placed reliance that if father continued to be the bread-winner of the family, there was no occasion for extending any compassion to appoint his son. But the learned single Judge has, in this behalf, taken notice of the following:
(2.) THERE has been some attempt before us on behalf of the appellants to suggest that it does not follow from the agreement aforequoted that on the death of the step-mother, when father of the writ petitioner-respondent was still working, the son could be extended any compassionate appointment as the dependant of the family. A plain reading of the agreement goes in support of the contention. Learned single Judge has, however, noticed the interpretation of the agreement by the appellants to extend the benefit of compassionate appointment, when one of the two working parents dies, as the office order extends similar compassionace appointment to other persons. He has, however, taken care not to issue a direction to give appointment to the writ petitioner- respondent. He has asked the appellants to consider the case of the writ petitioner-respondent in the light of the office order afore-quoted and the other orders issued from time to time in this behalf. Learned Counsel for the appellants, however, tried to persuade us to take the view that if any such appointment has been given in the past, the same is contrary to the agreement and thus may be a wrong doing on the part of the appellants, but the Court should not issue a mandamus or direction to repeat the wrong which the appellants have committed. The principle, as stated by the learned Counsel for the appellants, is sound and correct. It is universally acknowledged by the Courts that no mandamus or direction be issued to do a wrong thing only because in the past certain wrong things have been done. It is, however, not possible, on the materials as placed before us, to hold that the management has not genuinely interpreted the agreement and issued compassionate appointment orders in similar cases. One who issues an order and interprets it or one who is a party to the agreement and has already interpreted it, will not change the interpretation from case to case. It may not be wrong in such a situation to hold against the appellants that its Contemporanea Exposito will bind it and shall be obliged to extend the same privilege to the writ petitioner- respondent as it has extended in other cases. Learned single Judge has left it to the wisdom of the appellants and has given a direction to decide the case of the writ petitioner-respondent in the light of various orders issued by it. We do not think any case, for interference in the appeal, has been made out. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.