COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX Vs. SHAHZADI BEGUM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On the application of the Revenue, filed under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short "the Act"), this court issued a direction to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to state the case and refer the following questions of law for opinion, by its order in I.T.C. No. 233 of 1985 passed on 2/09/1986. The questions read as follows :

(2.) The assessee is an individual. In the assessment year 1976-77, the assessee filed her return. However, the Income-tax Officer considered it a fit case to proceed under section 144B of the Act. He prepared a draft assessment order and signed it on 27/03/1979. That order appears to have been served on the representative of the assessee on 29/03/1979. The objections of the assessee were filed on 12/04/1979. The draft assessment order and the objections of the assessee were sent to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (IAC) for approval. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner granted his approval on 22/09/1979. Thereupon, the order of the assessment was passed by the Income-tax Officer on 26/09/1979. That order of the Income-tax Officer was questioned before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), inter alia, on the ground that it was barred by limitation. On 4/09/1981, the Commissioner dismissed the appeal. The assessee then carried the matter in second appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the assessment was barred by limitation and accordingly allowed the appeal of the assessee on 30/11/1982. Thus, the above said questions are said to arise from that order of the Tribunal.

(3.) Mr. S.R. Ashok, learned standing counsel for the Revenue, vehemently contends that the expression "forward" in section 144B could only mean that the draft order goes out of the control of the Income-tax Officer and the moment it is signed it must be deemed that it has gone out of his control and, therefore, the date of signing should be taken as the date of "forwarding". He argues that a purposive construction should be given to the provisions of the taxing statute and the purpose of the provision is to give a fair opportunity to the assessee to object to the draft order and the time limit fixed should not be so strictly construed as to make the order of assessment barred by limitation. None appeared for the assessee.