KHEM CHAND Vs. STATE OF A P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence given by the Courts below under Section 16(1)(a)(1) of the Prevention of the Food Adulteration Act, this revision was filed by A-1.

(2.) The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a dealer in grocery and on 27-11-1981, the Food Inspector (PW.1) inspected his shop and took a sample of 750 grams of Chana Dal by paying Rs.2-25 ps. On the very next day i.e. on 28-11-1981, the public analyst opined that the Chana Dal is mixed with Kesari Dal and the petitioner was given a show-cause notice on the basis of the analyst report. The petitioner pleaded warranty under Section 14 of the Act by stating that he purchased the same from the firm owned by A-2 to A-5 who in turn pleaded that they purchased the same from A-6. In fact, A-6 also pleaded that the stocks were purchased from A-7. On the basis of the explanation offered by all these persons, the Food Inspector (P.W.1) laid charge-sheet in C.C.No.275 of 1991 on the file of the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad against all the persons. While the petitioner was shown as A-1, the others were shown as A-2 to A-7. The learned Magistrate by judgment dated 20-10-1992 convicted and sentenced the petitioner i.e. A-1, A-3 the Managing Partner of the firm belonging to A-2 to A-5 and A-6. As far as A-7 is concerned, the Magistrate recorded a finding that the prosecution failed to prove that the stocks were purchased by A-6 from A-7. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the three accused filed separate appeals. While the petitioner filed Crl.A. No.232 of 1992, the other accused filed Crl.A.Nos.237 and 239 of 1992. While the appeal preferred by the petitioner was heard by the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, the other two appeals were heard by the I Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge. The learned Appellate Judge in Crl.A.No.232 of 1992 confirmed the conviction and sentence given by the Magistrate against the petitioner. The I Additional Sessions Judge allowed the appeals filed by A-3 and A-6 by holding that the petitioner (A-1) could not prove the warranty pleaded by him. Against the judgment in Crl.A.No.232 of 1992 dated 16-3-1993, A-l preferred the present revision, before this Court.

(3.) Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri C. Praveen Kumar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner raised several contentions including the one that the sample analysed by the Public Analyst was not the same sample which was collected from the shop of the petitioner. While the receipt given to the petitioner by the Food Inspector shows that the sample was collected under Sample No.64/81/TV/W, the Public Analyst Report shows that it relates to the sample bearing No.62/81/IV/W. From this, it is evident that the sample is not the one which was collected from the shop of the petitioner and sent to Public Analyst for analysis. But, the lower Appellate Court explains this discrepancy by stating that the sample bottle given to the petitioner and the panchanama drafted at the time of purchase of the sample show that the sample number is 62/81/IV/W and as such, the petitioner is having the knowledge to show that the sample was collected under No.62/81/IV/W. On that basis, the lower Appellate Court confirmed the conviction. But, at the same time, from the record, it is seen that the prosecution miserably failed to prove as to how this discrepancy had occurred. It is not the duty of the Court to draw inference. As this being a criminal proceeding, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove that the sample analysed is the one that was collected from the shop of the petitioner. As the prosecution miserably failed to explain this discrepancy, I am of the opinion that the lower Appellate Court went wrong in confirming the judgment of the Trial Court. Further, the offence is said to have taken place way back in 1981 i.e. 15 years ago. Hence, I do not find any reason to sustain the conviction and sentence given by the Courts below against the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner is acquitted by giving benefit of doubt.