P G KRISHNA REDDY Vs. LAND REFORMS TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner in this writ petition made a declaration under the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 in C.C. Nos. 1469 and 1470/GDR/75. The question that was considered by the Land Reforms Tribunal in that case was, whether Exs. A. 17 to A. 23, which were seven registered documents, were hit by Sec. 7 of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, herein-after referred to as 'the Act'. Sec. 7 reads as follows

(2.) The first question that has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in this writ petition is that the Land Reforms Tribunal has no power to review the order passed by it earlier, which was confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal and by this court. The argument is that there is no power vested in the Tribunal by any statute empowering it to review its orders which has becomes final. The second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, in any case, the Primary Tribunal is not the competent authority to review the earlier orders passed by it, which have been merged into the levisiomal orders passed by this court.

(3.) The question whether the Land Reforms Tribunal has power to review its orders or not, was considered by my learned brother Seetharam Reddy,J. in Bhogyalakshmi vs. State of A.P, 1980(1) APLJ 414 J980H) ALT57(NRO. There, the learned judge upheld and objection to a review petition filed to review an order under the Act only on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of 30 days prescribed by the law of limitation. But, otherwise, the learned judge proceeded on the basis that the Tribunal was empowered to review its orders. 1, therefore, take the above decision in Bhagyalakshmi's Case (1) as an authority for the position that the Tribunals under the Land Reforms Act have the power to review their decision. But, I must add a footnote to the above judgement that the law of limitation, as enacted by the Limitation Act, would not apply to the Tribunals and would apply only to, the courts and that, therefore, the holding of the above case to the extent it lays down that the review application should be filed within 30 days, cannot be supported on the basis of any statutory authority. But the traditional remedy of review referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure is based upon the specified grounds of error aparent on the face of the record discovery of new and important matters of evidence and analogus reasons. But those limitations, which are peculiar to the remedy of review provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot be applied where the court is acting in defence of its own process, on the allegation that the parties who have obtained the orders have played fraud on the court. Fraud cannot be the basis of any public act, however frequently it may be resorted to. In this case, the ground on which the case has been reopened is that the petitioners used faked and bogus receipts showing payment of land revenue. In such a case, not only the court but every tribunal which has been the victim of that foul play should be allowed to recall its orders passed upon or influenced by such polluted evidence. The judgment of a Division Bench of this court lays down that proposition in P. Satyanarayana vs. L.R. Tribunal, 1979 (2) APLJ. 50-=1979 (1; ALT 79 NRC. In an of-quoted passage from the judgment of Lord Denning in Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasky, 1956-1, ALL ER 341, it is clear that no judgment of a Court, no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. See Portop Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72.. The allegation in this case is that the petitioners had played such a fraud and obtained an order in their favour. It is, . therefore, open for the Tribunal, when it is convinced prima facie on the basis of the affidavit of the Authorised Officer that fraud has been played, to reopen the case and to recall the order made by it. From the papers on record, it appears that the petitioners, who had got ac 310-00 and above, escapdd wholely from the operation of the Act. Seetruran Roddy. J in his jadgment in CRP. No. 1153 of 1986, has upheld the powers of the Tiibunal in similar circumstances. I respectfully follow that judgment and the judgments mentioned above and held that it is not only the right but the duty of the Tribunal to see that the purity of the judicial process is maintained at all costs, both from the parties and their agents. On the above two alternative grounds, I up-hold the power of review or the power of recall sought to be exercised by the Primary Tribunal and objected to by the writ petitioners in this writ petition But it is argued by Sri Ramana Reddi at great length, on the basis of the unresolved controversy relating to the difference between a void order and a voidable order, that theory of Lazarus Estates case (30) would apply only when it was found that the order has been obtained by frauds, that there is a presumption that till such finding is recorded, the earlier finding is obtained that earlier orders had been obtained by playing fraud. At that point of time, there would be no necessity to show that the orders were in fact obtained by fraud. All that would be necessary at that point of time is to see whether there is reasonable and probable cause made out for the reopening of the case. In this case, the petitioners' use of faked and bogus cist receipt:, in my opinion, is enought to reopen this case. I hold accordingly.