CHAVALI SHIVAJI Vs. GOVT OF A P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ORDER :- In the years 1977 and 1978, the A.P. State Road Transport Corporation (for short - 'APSRTC') published draft proposals under Section 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, proposing the Nationalisation of almost all the routes of Nellore and Prakasam Districts. Although the draft scheme were published more than nine years back, they not finally disposed of by the State Government under Section 68D of the Motor Vehicles Act hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). As a result, these draft proposals have been continuing to remain as draft proposals only. While they remain as draft proposals, objections and representations have been filed by the Public and the existing transport operators. But the Government did not consider those objections and as a result, they neither notified nor approved the draft proposals to the above deplorable situation, the directions issued by this court to call for fresh representations made no difference. In a batch of writ petitions, which were disposed of by the Supreme Court on 11-10-1985, the pucca permit holders had complained to the Supreme Court that these draft proposals have grown stale and irrelevant by the lapse of time and that they should be quashed. The Supreme Court, by its order dated 11-10-1985, had dismissed that batch of writ petitions observing that, by reason of the withdrawal of the draft schemes on 7th August, 1985, no relief in those writ petitions could be granted by the Supreme Court. Accordingly those writ petitions have been dismissed on the ground that they have became infructuous. In Civil Appeal Nos. 4230 and 4231 of 1985, the Supreme Court, has quashed draft scheme No. 402 of 1977, by its order dated. 20th September, 1985, on the ground that it has become invalid by lapse of time. While doing so, the Supreme Court observed in the above Civil Appeals that the Transport Undertaking of the State of Andhra Pradesh will have to be at liberty to publish if it is so advised, a fresh draft scheme under Section 68C of the Act. The off shoot of all these events is the withdrawal of all the draft schemes relating to Nellore and Prakasam districts by the A.P.S.R.T.C. by a notification dated 7-8-1986. On 22nd August, 1986, the APSRTC published fresh draft schemes relating to these two districts which were prepared on 14th August, 1986. As a consequence, the existing draft schemes of Nellore and Praksam Districts have been superseded and fresh draft schemes have been published by the APSRTC. In this batch of writ petitions, it is the validity of the notification of the APSRTC dated 7th August, 1986, withdrawing the old draft schemes and also the validity of the new draft schemes dated 14th August, 1986, published by the, APSRTC on 22nd August, 1986 that is challenged.

(2.) It is not really necessary to reiterate what has been said so often in these courts about Chapter IV-A of the Act, which is enacted by the Parliament in order to explore the operation of Chapter IV of the Act under which the private operators are free to obtain transport permits on a footing of equality with all others including the State Transport Undertaking (for short 'STU'). The purpose of Chapter IV-A is to enable the STU to run on a monopoly basis the transport vehicles on the routes which have been notified by them and approved by the State Government. Section 68C says,

(3.) Learned counsel have argued the following questions of law. The STU had no power to withdraw these draft schemes without the leave of the Government or the Supreme Court because the matter was sub judice on 7th August, 1986. I must frankly confess my great inability to follow this submission of the learned counsel. I consider this submission is utterly devoid of any legal substance. In a polity run by law, each organ has its responsibilities and duties and powers and functions. Merely because a matter is pending before the Supreme Court, it does not automatically follow that nothing can be done about that matter by anybody. The question whether any liberty is retained by the parties to exercise their statutory power and perform their normal functions and duties is a question which must be decided on the basis of the statute and not by according disproportionately enhanced importance to one question over the other. The fact that this matter has been pending before the Government, in my opinion, is of least importance for considering the question whether the STU has or has not the power to withdraw these schemes. The analogy of the Code of Civil Procedure based on the right of the parties to withdraw their cases, does not appear to me to be apposite at all. Nobody has suggested that the Code of Civil Procedure is a universal Code of Procedure that would apply or should apply for settlement of all the disputes under the sun. In any case, that Order 23, Civil Procedure Code, would apply to the proceedings before the Government under Chapter IV-A of the Act, is not supported by any authorities nor do I find any principle on which such a submission can be grounded. In fact, Order 23 is not a denial of the right of the plaintiff to withdraw a suit. It recognises the right of the plaintiff to withdraw his suit or abandon his claim; but, because of the fact of res judicata and also because of the fact of the other interests such as those of the minors, the court insists upon its leave being granted for the withdrawals. Where the plaintiff withdraws his suit without such a leave, the result would be to debar him from bringing a fresh round of litigation. The penalty does not go beyond that. It is argued that while the writ petitions filed by the pucca holders were pending before the Supreme Court in the month of August, 1986 (and they were later disposed of in the month of October, 1986), the power of the STU to withdraw the old draft schemes stood curtailed by reason of the interim order made by the Supreme Court staying all further proceedings. The argument is that the words "all further proceedings" will take in the power of the STU to withdraw the schemes also. I am not able to understand the language of that interim order in that way. Remembering the fact that the interim order was made in the context of a writ filed by the pucca permit-holders challenging the validity of these draft schemes, and not forgetting that the interim orders of the Supreme Court are made for the benefit of the writ petitioner, those orders, in my opinion, cannot be construed as denying the withdrawal of the schemes, which is what the petitioners have wanted as final relief in that batch of writ petitions. The orders of the Supreme Court must, therefore, be understood that all further proceeding before the Government alone were stayed. That means the Government should not consider the objections and thereby render the hearing of the writ petitions largely infructuous. After all, interim orders are made in support of the final relief granted. Therefore, those interim orders should not be understood as having any relation with matters of remote relevance like the withdrawals of the old schemes. I am, therefore, of the opinion, that this argument of the learned counsel should be rejected.