SHIVAJI Vs. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In the years 1977 and 1978, the A.P. State Road Transport Corporation (for short-APSRTC) published draft proposals under section 68-C of the MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988, 1939, proposing the Nationalisation of almost all the routes of Nellore and Prakasam Districts. Although the draft schemes were published more than nine years back, if they were not finally disposed of by the State Government under Section 68-D of the MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). As a result, these drafts proposals have been continuing to remain as draft proposals only. While they remain as draft proposals, objections and representations have been filed by the public and the existing transport operators. But the State Government did not consider those objections and as a result, they neither modified nor approved the draft proposals. To the above deplorable situation, the directions issued by this court to call for fresh representations made no difference. In a batch of writ petitions, which were disposed of by the Supreme Court on 11-10-1985, the pucca permit holders had complained to the Supreme Court that these drafts proposals have grown stale and irrelevant by the lapse of time and that they should be quashed. The Supreme Court, by its order dated, 11-10-1985, had dismissed that batch of writ petitions observing that, by reason of the withdrawal of the draft schemes on 7th August, 1985, no relief in those writ petitions could be granted by the Supreme Court. Accordingly those writ petitions have been dismissed on the ground that they have become infructuous. In Civil Appeal Nos. 4230 and 4231 of 1985, the Supreme Court, has quashed draft scheme No. 402 of 1977, by its order 'dated, 20th September, 1985, on the ground that it has become invalid by lapse of time. While doing so, the Supreme Court observed in the above civil Appeals that the Transport Undertaking of the state of Andhra Pradesh will have to be at liberty to publish if it is so advised, a fresh draft scheme under section 68-C of the Act. The off shoot of alt these events is the withdrawal of all the draft schemes relating to Nellore and Prakasam Districts by the A.P.S.R.T.C. by a notification dated. 7-8-1986.. On 22nd August, 1986, the APSRTC. published fresh draft schemes relating to these two districts which were prepared on 14th August, 1986. As a consequence, the existing draft schemes of Nellore and Prakasam Districts have been superseded and fresh draft schemes have been published by the APSRTC. In this batch of writ petitions, it is the validity of the notification of the APSRTC. dated 7th August, 1986. withdrawing the old draft schemes and also the validity of the new draft schemes dated 14th August, 1986, published by the APSRTC on 22nd August, 1986 that is challenged.

(2.) It is not really necessary to reitarate what has been said so often in these courts about Chapter IV-A of the Act, which is enacted by the Parliament in order to explore the operation of Chapter IV of the Act under which the private operators are free to obtain transport permits on a footing of equality with all others including the State Transport undertaking (forshort'STU'). The purpose of Chapter IV-A is to enable the STU to run on a monopoly basis the transport vehicles on the routes which have been notified by them and approved by the State Government. Section 68-C says. "Where any state Transport undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation t,o any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State Tra'nsport Undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State transport undertaking may prepare a scheme" Such a scheme should be published in the Gazette and in the local newspapers. The class of persons referred to in section 68-D may file their objections to this scheme if they are so advised. The State Government, after considering the objections and hearing those objections and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking, approves or modifies the scheme or even scraps it. Once the scheme is approved as originally proposed or in its modified form, it is the STU that will be clothed with the financial administrative and legal powers to run the business on the notified routes' But, before the draft schemes are considered and approved by the state Government, there is section 68-F(l-C) under which the private operators can run on a temporary basis their transport vehicles till the schemes are approved or modified or cancelled. It is in compliance with the requirement of, section 68-F(l-C) that these operators have obtained temporary permits and have been running their vehicles. In views of the fact that section 68-F(l-C) under which, the petitioners in this batch of writ petitions 'have obtained the temporary permits says that the temporary permits should be valid only during the currency of the draft schemes, the temporary permits which they have obtained have become invalid by reason of the withdrawal of the draft schemes on 7th August, 1986. The petitioners says that by reason of the above provision of law, about 250 temporary permits have been rendered inoperative. They have, therefore, filed these writ petitions challenging the above mentioned two notifications, viz., The first notification withdrawing the said draft schemes and secondly the publication of the new draft schemes.

(3.) Learned counsel have argued the following questions of law. The STU had no power to withdraw these draft schemes without the leave of the Government or the Supreme Court because the matter was subjudice on 7th August, 1986. I must frankly confess my great inability to follow this submission of the learned counsel. I consider this submission is utterly devoid of any legal substance. , In a polity run by law, each organ has its responsibilities and duties and powers and Junctions. Merely because a matter is pending before the Supreme Court, ft does hot automatically follow that nothing can be done about that matter by anybody. The question whether any liberty is retained by the parties to exercise their statutory power and perform their normal functions and duties is a question which must be decided on the basis of the statute and not by according disproportionately enhanced importance to one question over the other. The fact that this matter has' been pending before the Government, in my opinion, is of least important for considering the question whether the STU has or has not the power to withdraw these schemes. The analogy of the Code of Civil Procedure based on the right of the parties to withdraw their cases, does not appear to me to be apposite at all. Nobody has suggested that the Code of Civil Procedure is a universal Code of Procedure that would apply or should apply for settlement of all the disputes under the sun. In any case, that order 23, Civil Procedure Code, would apply to the proceedings before the Government under Chapter IV-A of the Act, is not supported by any authorities nor do I find any principle on which such a submission can be grounded. In fact, order 23 is not a denial of the right of the plaintiff to withdraw a suit. It recognises the right of the plaintiff to withdraw his suit or abondon his claim ; but, because of the fact of res-judicata and also because of the fact of the other interests such as those of the minors, the court insists upon its. leave being granted for the withdrawals. Where the plaintiff withdraws his suit without such a leave, the result would be to debar him from bringing a fresh round of litigation. The panalty does not go beyond that. It is: argued that while the writ petitions filed by the pucca holders were pending before the Supreme Court in the month of August, 1986 (and they were later disposed of in the month of October, 1986), the power of the STU to withdraw the old draft schemes stood curtailed by reason of the interim order made by the Supreme Court staying all further proceedings. The argument is that the words "all further proceedings will take in the power of the STU to withdraw the schemes also. I am not able to understand the language of that interim order in that way. Remembering the fact that the interim order was made in the context of a writ filed by the pucca permitholders . challenging the validity of these draft schemes, and not, forgetting that the interim orders of the Supreme Court are made for the benefit of the writ petitioner, these orders, in my opinion, cannot be construed as denying the withdrawal of the schemes, which is what the petitioners have wanted as final relief in that batch of writ petitions. The orders of the Supreme Court must, therefore, be understood that all further proceedings before the Government alone were stayed. That means the Government should not consider the objections and thereby render the hearing of the writ petitions largely infructuous. After all, interim orders are made in support of the final relief granted. Therefore, these interim orders should not be understood, as having any relation with matters of remote relevuse like the withdrawals of the old schemes. I am, therefore, of the opinion, that this argument of the learned counsel should be rejected.