(1.) Sub-sec. (1) S. 3 of Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (Act 9 of 1977) for short the Act reads :
(2.) The real question that falls for the decision of this Full Bench in these writ petitions is whether the expression and shall be deemed never to have been transferred occurring in S. 3(1) of the Act takes within its sweep transfers in respect of assigned lands which had been effected prior to 21-1-1977 on which date the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Ordinance was promulgated (and on which date the Act replacing that Ordinance is deemed to have come into force). In view of the conflict of opinion expressed by two Division Benches of this Court on this question, the matter has been referred to the Full Bench. In the judgment in W. A. No. 418 of 1979 dt. 26-12-1979 (which appears to have so far not been reported), a Division Bench consisting of Lakshmaiah and Narsinga Rao JJ. (referred to hereinafter as "the First Division Bench) affirmed the decision of Kondaiah J. (as he then was) in B. Seetha Ramanamma v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh (1979) 1 ALT 79 (referred to hereinafter as the Single Bench) that S. 3(1) prohibited only the transfers of assigned land from the date of the commencement of the Act; and the said Section did not take in any previous transfer effected prior to the commencement of the act of a land assigned previously. On the other hand, a subsequent Division Bench consisting of Gangadhara Rao and Jeevan Reddy JJ. (referred to hereinafter as the Second Division Bench) took a diametrically opposite view on the question in the judgment dt. 9-10-1980 in W. P. Nos. 3972/78 and Batch, reported in V. C. Kondayya v. District Collector, West Godavari (1980) 2 APLJ 423 : (AIR 1981 Andh Pra 62) holding that the Act applied to transfers made prior to the commencement of the Act as well. There is, however, no reference in the decision of the Second Division Bench to the decision of the First Division Bench, obviously for the reason that it has not been reported and was not, therefore brought to the notice of the learned Judges. For the same reason Choudary J. who critically commented upon the decision of the Single Bench (in Seetharamanamas case) and declined to follow the ruling therein or to refer the matter to a Division Bench, while hearing W. P. No. 2500 of 1978 reported in T. Onnuramma v. Tahsildar, Kadiri (1980) 2 ALT 276 : (AIR 1980 Andh Pra 267), which was disposed of on 8-8-80 also does not appear to have been referred to the decision of the First Division Bench.
(3.) In spite of the forceful argument advanced by the counsel for the writ petitioners, we do not find ourselves persuaded to agree with the view expressed by the Single Bench, affirmed by the First Division Bench. The Single Bench found on facts that the vendor, Nagaiah was not shown to be a landless poor person that the land involved in the case was not an assigned land as defined in S. 2(1) of the Act; hence the Act itself could not be applied. Whatever observation the learned Judge made on the basis of the discussion in the concluding paras 7 and 8 in the judgment is on a hypothesis that there existed a landless poor person and an assigned land, which in fact, as found by the learned Judge himself, did not exist; and could not, therefore, form the ratio decidendi of that case. The conspicuous absence of any discussion whatsoever on the pivotal expression and shall be deemed never to have been transferred in S. 3(1) of the Act, which was the material expression that was required to be construed, also diminished the binding nature, may even persuasive value, of the decision. It is also noticed that instead of interpreting the provisions contained in sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the Act, giving them the natural and the plain meaning of the language, what the learned Judge is seen to have done is to restrict the scope and meaning of the sub-section, referring to the statement of objects and reasons attached to the Bill, which according to the learned Judge, indicated that the intendment of the Act was to prohibit alienations of lands assigned to landless poor persons. The learned Judge went further to hold that the Statement of Objects and Reasons also indicated that the prohibition of transfer sought to be made null and void under the Act was prospective but not retrospective. Before the First Division Bench which affirmed the decision of the Single Bench, it was argued on behalf of the State (appellant) that the learned single Judge had, while construing sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the Act, lost sight of the implications contained in sub-sec. (5) of that Section, which reads as follows :