RAMANAYYA Vs. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The route, Simhachalam to Srikakulam is part of a route which is covered in parts by more than one approved scheme. The writ petitioner is one of the existing operators plying on the portions of the above approved routes. He is, therefore, saved under Note-3 appended to the approved schemes. That note saves the existing holders of stage carriage permits in respect of such route or routes, which partially overlap the approved route, from the operations of the approved schemes which exclude totally the private operators and reserve the right to ply on the approved routes only to the State Transport Undertakings. Now, the Regional Transport Authority, Visakhapatnam had notified applications of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for increase of singles from 2 to 3 in each case on the route of Simhachalam to Srikakulam which, as stated above, overlaps in parts the portions of the approved routes. Now, if this proposal is given effect to, there would be an increase in the number of trips from 2 to 3 in each case. The writ petitioner is an existing holder who is saved by the above-mentioned Note No. 3 appended to the approved schemes. He has filed this writ petition challenging the validity of the notification proposing to increase the trips and also to fix the timings. The petitioner's contention is that the proposal to increase the number of trips, violates the terms of the approved schemes forbidding the private operators from plying on the approved routes or parts thereof, and such a violation amounts to infraction of the law which the approved schemes are under Chapter IV-a of the Motor Vehicles Act. The petitioner says that this Court should, therefore, intervene and forbid the transport authorities from increasing the number of trips

(2.) Sri. T. Venkataramana, the learned Counsel for the contesting respondents had argued that under the terms and conditions of the approved schemes, there is no bar for the increase of the number of trips. He has relied upon a judgment of this Court reported in W. P. Nos. 3396/76 and 3477/76 dt. 3-2-1978 of Chinnappa Reddy, J. He accordingly, argues that this writ petition should be dismissed on the ground that there is no infraction of the law in terms of the scheme.

(3.) In the view I have taken, I have not considered, Sri Venkataramana's submission. I am of the opinion that this writ petition should fall on the ground that even if there is an infraction of the terms of the approved scheme, such as one which has been complained of in this case, this Court should not intervene, at the instance of a private operator. Before I set out my reasons for so holding, I want to emphasise the fact that under Art. 226 of the Constitution, this Court enjoys a wide choice either to intervene on behalf of a particular petitioner or not. In other words, the mere infraction of law does not justify this Court to intervene. Unlike a Civil Court, a writ Court has to take into account several considerations into account before issuing a writ. The first question that is to be examined in that context is the nature of the decree of the right of the private operators that has been preserved under an approved scheme. It must be noted that the purpose of an approved scheme is to exclude ail private operators from the route or routes which have been notified under Part-IV of the Motor Vehicles Act for operation by the State Transport Undertakings. It must therefore, be noted that under an approved scheme, a private operater has no recognised rights, except to the extent that an existing operator is saved. It is normally for the approved schemes to save the existing operators and their existing rights from total destruction and complete elimination. It must, therefore, be said that under an apprpved scheme, a private operator has legitimate rights only to the extent of protecting his existing rights. His legal remedies do not therefore expand to making a complaint about the infraction of law relating to other beneficiaries under the scheme. The invasion of the rights of the State Transport Undertakings by the R.T.A., permitting the plying of increased number of trips by private buses is an infringement of the rights of the S.T.U. and not that of the petitioner. By such infraction, it is the S.T.U. and not the private operator who is being primarily affected. It is the S.T.U. alone who should make the complaint. If the private operator's existing right to ply is directly affected, no doubt, his complaint should be entertained by this court. But, if the rights of the S.T.U. are affected, he may not be the person who can be said to have any cause of action. In such a case, it is only the S.T.U., that can make the complaint. Assuming that the increase of the trips violates the conditions of the approved scheme, I am of the opinion that the private operators has no cause of action to make a complaint to this court against such an infraction. Only the STU can make such a complaint. The question whether a particular person has a cause of action to make a complaint is a matter to be decided by gathering the intention of the Statute. In Beharilal Madugil vs. The Secretary to Govt, of A.P. Home Department, Hyderabad and Others ; I have considered this question, foliowing the decision in Universities Research Association vs. Coutu I held in that case that a private right of action cannot be implied except as an interpretation of the congressional intent. This is a ciear authority for the proposition that every infraction of law does not give rise to a private right of action. Right of action and infraction of law are two different things The question is to be examined in each case. We have to see in each case whether the infraction of law can be said to give rise to the right of action by a particular individual. That question can be answered in the case only by reference to the terms and conditions of this scheme. In visw of the fact that under the approved scheme, a private operator's rights are nominal and under Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the intention of law is to eliminate a private operator and provide for the running of the buses by the STU, it must be held that no right of action can be implied in favour of a private operator for the infraction of the rights of the STU. For that reason, I hold that this Court should interfere at the instance only of the State Transport Undertakings and it has not made any complaint against the infringement of its rights under the approved scheme. 1 cannot find any justification for entertaining this writ petition at the instance of the private operator.