HERBERTESONS LTD Vs. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners are licensed bonded Warehouse-holders of the liquor which they store in the warehouse There was an enhancement of excise duty from Rs. 21-50 to Rs. 30/-. Section 21 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act authorises levy of excise duty on any excisable, article manufactured or produced in the State. That section further provides that the 'Government may, by notification, levy on excise duty on any excisable article manufactured or produced in the State. Presumably, in compliance with this requirement of Section 21 of the Excise Act, the enhanced levy of excise duty was brought about by G.O.Ms.No. 1839, Revenue dated 23-4-1980, which was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 2nd May, 1980. The petitioners are made liable to pay the enhanced excise duty from that date onwards viz., 2nd May, 1980. The petitioners have filed this writ petition challenging the authority of the State to collect the revised rates of excise duty from 2nd May, 1980. They say that what was done on 2nd May,1980 was merely to print the above mentioned G.O.Ms.No. 1839 dated 23-4-1980 in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette without, however, making it available for sale. Their contention is that unless and until the G.O.Ms.No. 1839 dated 23-4-1980 was made known to the general public, the right of the Government to levy and collect the enhanced excise duty does not come into existence. In support of this contention, Sri Krishna, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed strong reliance on the decision in State of M.P. vs. Ram Raghubir Prasad. There the word "Publication" was interpreted to mean not merely communication to the concerned officers, but making it known to the community. The question that arises in this case is what meaning, should be given to the language of Section 21 of the Act, which says that the Government may, by notification, ievy on excise duty. The word "Notification" is defined by Clause (23) of Section 2 to mean a notification published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. It appears to me that this definition of the word "notifiaction" renders completely inapplicable the general meaning of the word "publiction" given in Ram Raghubir Prasad's case(1) (supra). In 'that' case, the word 'publicatibn' 'simpliciter has been given the wider meaning of publication to the entire community. But in the present case, the words used are wholly different. Firstly, there is no use of the word "publish". We only find that the word "notification" being I defined to mean a notification published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. By the use of those words in the A.P. Gazette what the statute considers and treats as notification is completely prescribed. Nothing is left for implication. According to that definition, "notification" is complete the moment it is publicshed in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. It does not require anything more or anything less or anything different from publication in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette to constitute a notification. In that context, it would not be permissible to import the general meaning of the word "publication" into the word "notification . In that context the words 'published in the Gazette' can only mean 'printed in the Gazette'. Assuming therefore, that the abovementioned G.O.Ms.No. 1839 dated 23-4-1980 was printed in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette only on 2nd May, 1980 and that the copies &f the Gazette were not available till 14th May, 1980, I am not able to hold that the Government has not levied excise duty by notification of 2nd May, 1980.

(2.) The other argument is equally untenable. It is well known that the subordinate legislation takes effect and becomes legally operative from the moment that it is made without its being made known to the community. De Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th Edition, Page 147) speaks with his authority : "The Predominant view is that an instrument becomes legally operative from the moment that is is made, x x x x". That was also the view which has been taken by C.K. Allen in his Law and Orders (3rd Edition,, p. 112). The contrary view taken by Bailhache, J., in Johnson vs. Sargant which was followed by our Supreme Court in Harla vs. State of Rajasthan, but was doubted in State of Maharashtra vs. M.H. Goerge was not considered as good law in England. A Division Bench of this Court in T.S. & C.K. Farm vs. State of Andhra Pradesh referring to the presumption enacted under Section 81 ana Illustration (e) under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act heid that a statute comes into existence on the date which it bears. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in G. Narayana Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not appear to be of much relevance.

(3.) In the above circumstances, this Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 250/-.