KALAVATHI Vs. STATE OF A P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is by one Smt. Kalavathi for the issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus for setting at liberty her husband, Shivasari Gangadhar (hereinafter referred to as the detenuT) who is undergoing detention pursuant to the order dated 6-6-1986 passed under Section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, by the second respondent, the District Magistrate (District Collector), Adilabad. The gravemen of the charge against the detenu is that he is the registered owner of lorry bearing No. A.T.J. 3041, and that he had been transporting paddy from Adilabad district in this State to Dharmabad District in Maharashtra State by making use of that lorry, without any permit in that behalf which he amounted to violation of clause 3 of the A.P. Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order read with Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. In the operative portion of the grounds it is stated as follows; You, thus contravened the provisions of (a) Cl. 3 of A.P. Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1983, (b) Cl. 7 of A.P. Rice Procurement (Levy) Order 1984 nw. Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. When the matter came up before the Division Bench earlier, it was contended that though the facts alleged would amount to contravention of the provisions of Clause 3 of A.P Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1983 (for short the paddy orderT), they would not amount to a contravention of clause 7 of A.P. Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 (for short, the Rice OrderT); and therefore, one of the grounds alleged and relied on by the detaining authority was non-existent and irrelevant; and, therefore, the detention order was illegal and was bound to be set aside. To press this point, the counsel for the petitioner had placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dwaraka Prasad v. State of Bihar1 wherein it was held that even if one of the grounds or reasons which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was non-existent or misconceived or irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid and it would not avail the detaining authority to contend that the other grounds or reasons were good and did not suffer from any such infirmity, because it could never be predicated as to whether the detention order would have been made at all even in the absence of non-existent or irrelevant grounds.

(2.) On behalf of the respondents, the learned Advocate General had drawn the attention of the Division Bench (to a recent Division Bench ruling of this Court (which appears to have been so far not reported) in W.P. No. 13033 and 13037/85 dated 11-12-1985, wherein it was held; Merely because a repealed Order is mentioned in the order of detention, it cannot be said that the order of detention is vitiated or becomes void. No decision has been brought to our notice in support of the said proposition. We also do not think this that the addition of a repealed Order has, in any manner, disabled the detenu from making a representation or to put forward his case.

(3.) In view of the fact that there appeared to be an apparent conflict between the decision of the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and the decision of our Division Bench, on the other, and considering the importance of the question of law involved, the Division Bench has referred the matter to a Full Bench; and thus it is before us now.