COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX Vs. CHAND R D

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two references by the Wealth-tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, hereinafter referred to as "the Act", are being disposed of by this common judgment as the questions of law arising in them are similar.

(2.) IN R. C. No. 51/74, the Wealth-tax Appellate Tribunal has formulated the following question :

(3.) THE legal representative appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who did not accept the plea put forth on behalf of the assessee with regard to the delay in filing the return. Before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, two other contentions were advanced, viz., (1) that the Wealth-tax Officer did not take the approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner before levying the penalty as required under law, and (2) that the quantum of penalty should have been calculated with reference to the provisions of Section 18(1)(a) of the Act, obtaining as on July 1, 1961, when the default was committed and not with reference to the provisions as obtaining at the time of the levy of the penalty. THE Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the first contention but acceded to the second contention and held that the scale of penalty applicable to the case was the one in force on July 1, 1961, when the default was committed. Since according to the provisions of Section 18(1)(a) of the Act, as in force on July 1, 1961, there was no minimum penalty prescribed in that scale, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner levied a penalty of Rs. 1,000 as he was of the opinion that this penalty would meet the ends of justice. Two appeals were preferred before the Tribunal. One was by the assessee with regard to the contention that the Wealth-tax Officer ought to have obtained prior approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner as required by law before levying penalty and as he did not do so the penalty was invalid. THE other appeal was by the revenue against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the extent that the provisions of Section 18(1)(a) of the Act as it stood on July 1, 1961, were held applicable to the case. THE Tribunal dismissed both the appeals. It came to the conclusion that since the default was committed on July 1, 1961, the law that would be applicable was Section 18(1)(a) of the Act as it stood on July 1, 1961. At the instance of the revenue, the above question was formulated.